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THE PRODUCT LIABILITY OF
MANUFACTURERS: AN UNDERSTANDING
AND EXPLORATION
by Donald M. Jenkins*
I. INTRODUCTION
E ARLY IN 1955 the United States Public Health Service selected five
pharmaceutical manufacturers to produce Salk Polio Vaccine. Quality
control procedures applicable to every step of the vaccine's preparation
were established by the Public Health Service. The Salk process was
expected to inactivate the live virus used in the preparation of the vaccine
but in this instance it failed to do so. One of the firms selected, Cutter
Laboratories, followed the prescribed safety tests which were deemed
adequate on the basis of the experience at that time. These tests were
intended to preclude the release of any vaccine with activated virus.
Nonetheless, a faulty vaccine was produced resulting in seventy-three
cases of polio and three deaths. Sixty damage suits were filed. Fifty-four
of them totaling claims of $11,813,000 were settled for $3,049,000.
Cutter's insurance covered $2,000,000 of the loss.1 The dominant theories
for imposing liability on Cutter would be either breach of warranty or
negligence. The warranty theory would raise the issues of whether or not
a sale of goods was involved and whether or not the injured persons were
the beneficiaries of any warranties since they were not in privity of
contract with the manufacturer. The negligence theory would require a
showing that Cutter failed in some respect to exercise the standard of care
of a reasonable person under the same or similar circumstances, a difficult
burden of proof since Cutter had scrupulously followed the government
specified procedures. When Cutter was pursued to a final judgment the
basis of recovery was on neither theory but on the theory of a breach of
an implied warranty sounding in tort resulting in Cutter's being held
strictly liable for the defective vaccine.2 An estimated 401,000 children
were vaccinated with the Cutter product.3 The potential liability of a
*Associate Professor of Business Law, University of Akron. B.A., J.D. University of
Akron.
1 Public Health Service, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Report on
Poliomyelitis Vaccine Produced by the Cutter Laboratories (August 25, 1955)
[hereinafter cited as Report on Poliomyelitis Vaccine].
2 Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1960).
3 Report on Poliomyelitis Vaccine.
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careful producer employing procedures founded upon the most advanced
knowledge and experience is alarming.
A manufacturer reads in The Wall Street Journal that a jury decided
the question of liability in favor of a plaintiff in a suit where it was alleged
that the rear axle and suspension design of the 1956 Volkswagen was
defectively designed causing the car to roll over under certain steering
conditions. The automobile in question was five years old when the
accident occurred, had been driven 50,000 miles and was purchased as a
second-hand car. The design of the 1956 Volkswagen was similar to that
of the cars made as early as 1945 and the rear axle and suspension system
of the 1968 model Volkswagens were similar in their basic concept. At
the time of the California suit, approximately 3,000,000 Volkswagens
were on the highway in the United States.4 The manufacturer is impressed
with the magnitude of his potential liability and wonders if there are
any limitations.
The impact of the above two examples is the enormity of the
potential liability of manufacturers to the users of products. A significant
development in the law of product liability is the expansion of the classes
of persons to whom the manufacturer may be liable. The direction of the
law in this respect is dramatically illustrated in Mitchell v. Miller, a 1965
Connecticut decision.5 An executrix brought an action for damages for
the death of the decedent. The decedent was playing golf when he was
run over and killed by an unattended, runaway automobile. The
automobile had rolled out of the parking lot of the golf course, down an
incline and onto the golf course striking the decedent. It was alleged that
the park position of the hydramatic transmission was defective allowing
the car to move. The charge against the manufacturer was that it had
expressly and impliedly warranted the automobile to be safe and fit for its
intended use and contained no defects that would endanger the public.
The manufacturer demurred to the complaint on the ground that no
privity existed between the decedent and the manufacturer. The court
noted that the deceased was not within the distributive chain of any
sale originating from the manufacturer nor could the deceased reasonably
have been anticipated by the manufacturer to have been one who would
use, occupy or service the automobile. In overruling the demurrer, the
court asserted that the public policy that protects the user or consumer
should also protect the innocent bystander. Are the persons to whom a
manufacturer may be liable for injuries caused by his product limitless?
The evolution and application of product liability law in the past
fifteen years represents one of the most dynamic developments in law.
Dean Prosser proclaims,
4 The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 29, 1968, at 8, col. 1.
5 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A. 2d 694 (1965).
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Since the year 1900 there has been no other set of cases which have
so rapidly and violently overthrown the existing law as those which
involve products liability.
6
The result of these rapid and violent developments has been to
substantially increase the susceptability of producers to suits by members
of the public in direct actions. It was assumed the crest of the wave of
expanded product liability was reached with the formulation of the
legal principles set forth in Section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of the Law of Torts. However, subsequent court actions proved this
assumption to be invalid.
What are the legal theories imposing product liability on manu-
facturers or producers? Has the law expanding the potential liability
of manufacturers reached its crest? That is, have the courts begun to
describe limitations of liability? To what extent are the expansive
developments being effectively employed? The pursuit of these questions,
and related questions, is the purpose of this article.
The beginning point will be an examination of the existing theories
of manufacturer's liability namely, negligence, contract warranty and
strict liability. For example purposes, Ohio law will be used to illustrate
the interpretative development of the law and its application. Ohio is a
legitimate jurisdiction for this purpose. It has been a pace-setting
jurisdiction in the development of the law and has arrived at the point of
accepting the concept of strict liability for defective products. Further-
more, the evolution of product liability law in Ohio typifies the pattern
that has occurred or is occurring in a majority of the other states. A
bench mark in this article will be the decision of the Supreme Court of
Ohio in Lonzrick v. Republic Steel 7 in which the concept of strict liability
for defective products emerged. The major emphasis of the article will be
an analysis of the developments in the law within and without Ohio since
the decision in Lonzrick. The purpose of this analysis will be to determine
the current direction and effect of the law of product liability in those
jurisdictions that subscribe to the concept of strict liability. Of primary
concern will be the identification, if any, of the limitations on manu-
facturers' liability. In conclusion, a summary of findings and recommen-
dations for clarification of the law of product liability will be offered.
II. THE THEORIES OF PRODUCT LIABILITY
A manufacturer may be held legally accountable to a person who has
been injured by his product on several possible theories. He may have
violated a statute, such as a pure food statute, which imposes a strict
6 Prosser, Spectacular Change: Products Liability in General, 36 Clev. B. Assn. J.
149 (1964-65).
7 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E. 2d 185 (1966).
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duty on a manufacturer not to sell contaminated food and provides
remedies to one injured by violation of the act's provisions. There are
several statutes of this nature dealing with specific products. On the other
hand, his liability may be founded upon broader principles of law;
namely, negligence, breach of warranty or strict liability in tort. These
broader principles of liability represent the rapidly developing and
changing areas of the law of product liability. Therefore, as a point
of departure, an understanding of the specific attributes of each of
these theories is essential.
Negligence Liability
A person who has sustained injury to his person or property by
reason of the use, storage or consumption of a product may recover
damages from the manufacturer pursuant to the usual principles of
negligence law. That is, the plaintiff in a products liability case may
recover if he can establish the three essential elements of negligence
liability: (1) the existence of a duty owing by the manufacturer to the
plaintiff; (2) the failure of the manufacturer to discharge that duty; and
(3) injury or damage to the plaintiff proximately resulting from the
breach of duty. Allegations of negligence may charge the manufacturer
with the failure to carefully design, manufacture, process, inspect, test,
disclose known defects, warn of known dangers, or adequately instruct in
the use of the product. The right to recover on the theory of negligence
is based on the common law right not to be injured through the
fault of another.
In a products liability suit founded on negligence, the plaintiff has
the burden of proving the elements of liability. This is often a difficult
burden for the plaintiff. Allegations of failure to carefully design, reveal
known defects, warn or adequately instruct may be sustained by proof
readily available to the plaintiff. However, suits alleging negligence in
manufacturing, processing, inspecting, or testing often present momentous
problems in obtaining the necessary evidence. The doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur may be pleaded to assist in carrying the burden of proof but
the need to resort to this doctrine reflects the desperate nature of the
plaintiff's ability to produce the evidence. In order to invoke res ipsa
loquitur, the accident causing the injury must be of a kind which
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; the
accident must be caused by an agency or instrumentally within the control
of the manufacturer; and the accident must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff. Thus,
the plaintiff's opportunity to invoke the doctrine is limited and in the
alternative he is put to his proof of negligent conduct.
The common defenses to a negligence action are contributory
negligence, assumption of risk and abnormal or unintended use. Thus,
Spring 1971
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even though the plaintiff may be able to sustain his burden of proof,
the manufacturer may be able to avoid liability by asserting and
proving any of these defenses.
An important factor in a products liability suit based on negligence
is defining to whom the manufacturer owes the duty of reasonable care.
Originally, the courts held that a manufacturer who had not actually sold
the product to the consumer, or user, had no duty to exercise reasonable
care relative to the product's safety. The case generally cited as
establishing this early rule of law is Winterbottom v. Wright.8 The
plaintiff in that suit was injured when a mail-coach broke down from
latent defects in its construction. He pressed his action against the party
who had supplied it and a third person under a contract of supply and
maintenance. The English court denied the suit on the basis that there
was no privity of contract between the injured party and the defendant
supplier. Lord Abinger expressed his concern over a party not in privity
being subject to suit by every passenger in the coach or by any
bystander who might be injured by the upsetting of the coach,
Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the
parties who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous
consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue.9
Ten years later New York's highest court altered this privity rule in
negligence actions. In Thomas v. Winchester,10 a dealer in drugs carelessly
labeled a deadly poison and sent it into the market. The court held that
the dealer was liable to all persons who were injured by using the
mislabeled medicine. The liability of the dealer, said the court, arises not
out of any privity between him and the person injured but out of the
duty the law imposes upon him to avoid acts in their nature dangerous to
the lives of others. Present is the concept that one who sells a defective
product that is imminently dangerous is liable to any person injured as
a natural and probable cause of its use. The privity requirement is
nullified when a defective product is imminently dangerous.
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company" fortified the premise that
privity was not an essential element of a negligence action. A manu-
facturer supplied an automobile with a defective wheel. The evidence
indicated that the defect could have been discovered by reasonable
inspection. The injured plaintiff had purchased the automobile from a
dealer. Judge Cardozo defined the issue to be whether the manufacturer
owed a duty of care to anyone but his immediate purchaser. It was held
that if the nature of a product is such that it is reasonably certain to
endanger life and limb if negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. If
8 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
9 Id. at 405.
10 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
11217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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to this element of danger is added knowledge that the product will be
used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests,
then irrespective of contract, the manufacturer is under a duty to make it
carefully. The manufacturer's liability to non-privity parties is determined
by his knowledge that the imminently dangerous product will be used in
the normal course of events by persons other than the buyer. Hence, a
manufacturer who is negligent and markets an imminently dangerous
product may be liable to non-privity parties whose association with the
product is foreseeable. The same liability has been placed upon manufac-
turers who market inherently dangerous products. That is, products that
by their nature are or may be dangerous, such as poisons or dynamite.
The Restatement of the Law of Torts takes the position that privity
of contract is a concept that is entirely inappropriate to tort litigation.'2
Nevertheless, a number of jurisdictions still subscribe to the privity
requirement in negligence actions.' 3 These jurisdictions have engrafted so
many exceptions on the rule, such as privity not being required when the
defective product is inherently or imminently dangerous, that the privity
requirement is extremely limited.
Warranty Liability Arising from Contract
To understand recent court decisions dealing with warranties and
product liability, it is important to note that originally in common law a
warranty action was viewed as a tort action in the nature of a deceit
action against the vendor. No contract elements were associated with the
warranty suit.14 The first reported case characterizing warranty as
contractual in nature was Stuart v. Wilkens. 5 Wilkens, the vendor,
expressly warranted that a mare was sound. The plaintiff asserted he
relied on this assertion and that the seller knew that the animal was
diseased. The issue for resolution was whether or not an express warranty
action was a proper form for the case. Lord Mansfield held that the giving
of a warranty at the time of a sale creates an obligation in the nature of
an assumpsit and when the promise has been executed, an express
warranty arising from a contractual transaction is a proper form of
action to press against a promisor. In such an instance, consideration
must be shown to maintain the warranty action.
Both forms of warranty actions survived the Stuart v. Wilkens case.
In a warranty action, as opposed to an action in deceit, it was determined
early that scienter was immaterial. 16 The gist of the recovery right is the
noncompliance with the terms of the promise, express or implied. The
12 Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sections 388, 394, 395, 396, 397 and 497 (1965).
13 Annot., 74 A.L.R. 2d 1111 (1960).
'4 Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 1, at 8-9 (1888).
1599 Eng. Rep. 15 (1778).
16 Shippen v. Bowen, 122 U.S. 575 (1887).
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same case that established the privity requirement for a negligence action
also set down the ironclad requirement that privity of contract is
necessary to maintain a cause of action ex contractu.17 Hence, under the
early law, requiring privity in both negligence and warranty actions,
the manufacturer's potential liability to the ultimate consumer, user or
bystander was limited indeed.
Commercially, the warranty has been viewed as an implied or
express promise, contractual in nature. The manufacturer's warranty
obligations arise upon sale of his product by virtue of the statutory
provisions contained in the Uniform Commercial Code.18 The express
warranties arise from affirmations of fact made by the seller which serve
as material considerations in entering the bargain. The implied warranties
are placed in the bargain by operation of law. The Code describes two
implied warranties, one of fitness for a particular purpose and one of
merchantability. The former arises whenever the manufacturer has reason
to know his products are required for a special purpose and the buyer
relies on his skill and judgment in selecting or furnishing the product.
The merchantability warranty appears whenever the sale is by a merchant.
This includes a manufacturer. This warranty assures the product sold
is of merchantable quality or fit for the ordinary and usual purpose for
which the goods are intended. These warranties are identified with a
contract for the sale of goods.
Considering warranty liability as contractural in nature, it would
seem that a manufacturer's liability could be limited quite readily. First,
as to express warranties, he need not make any. This conduct, of course,
has commercial limitations. Second, as to implied warranties, he should
be able to disclaim or exclude them by language in the contract. The
Uniform Commercial Code provides for such exclusions.' 9 However, such
exclusions must not be unconscionable. 20 The Code permits the manu-
facturer who elects not to disclaim the implied warranties to limit the
remedies available to the beneficiary of the warranties.n Specific pro-
visions allow the manufacturer to alter the measure of damages.' He may
limit the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment of the
price or to the repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or parts.
Of significance is the provision permitting the limitation or exclusion of
consequential damages unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscion-
able. The limitation of consequential damage for injury to the person in
17 Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
18 Uniform Commercial Code, §§ 2-312, 2-313, 2-314, 2-315.
19 Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-316.
20 The leading case on this point is Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960).
21 Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-719.
22Id. § 2-719 (1) (a).
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the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation
of damages when the loss is commercial is not.23 In total, it would
appear that the manufacturer's attempt to either negate the implied
warranties or limit damages for personal injuries resulting from a
breach of warranty might offend the requirement of conscionability.
A contract warranty action against a manufacturer differs signifi-
cantly from a negligence suit. The plaintiff's first concern is to insure
compliance with the notice requirement of the Code.24 Beyond that, he
must prove the warranty, that he is a beneficiary of the warranty, and
the injuries proximately caused the breach. However, the reason for the
breach or the conduct of the manufacturer contributing to the condition
of the product need not be alleged or proved. Thus, the plaintiff's
burden of proof is lightened somewhat in a warranty action as opposed
to a negligence suit where he must allege and prove the culpable
conduct of the defendant.
The characterization of warranty as ex contractu raises the question
of who are the beneficiaries of any warranties made or implied. The
privity question arises when warranty is viewed as a covenant. The Uni-
form Commercial Code extends the warranties of a seller beyond the
immediate purchaser 25 even though it consistently classifies warranty as
an element of a sales contract. The courts have seen fit to limit any privity
defense particularly when the product is intended for human consumption
or could present a threat to the safety of a person. Some states have even
precluded the privity defense where the only loss was monetary or to
property.26 Nevertheless, in warranty actions the question of privity still
appears reflecting the traditional view of the action as one arising in
contract.27 The method used most frequently by the courts to overcome
the privity defense is to redefine the warranty action in its original tort
31d., § 2-719 (3).
24 Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-607.
25 Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-318. This section offers three alternatives. Alterna-
tive A extends a seller's warranties to any natural person who is in the family orhousehold of the buyer or who is a guest in the buyer's home if it is reasonable to
expect that such person will use, consume or be affected by the goods and such
person is injured in his person by breach of a warranty. Alternative B extends the
warranties to any natural person who may be reasonably expected to use, consume orbe affected by the goods and who is injured in his person by breach of warranty. A
seller may not limit the operation of this Alternative. Alternative C extends the
warranties to the same persons as Alternative B but encompasses all injuries
resulting from a breach of warranty. However, the seller may limit the operation of
Alternative C except with respect to injuries to the person.
26 Spence v. Three Rivers Builders and Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.
2d 873 (1958); Santor v. A. and M. Karaghensian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A. 2d 305(1965); Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2nd 132, 209 N.E. 2d 583 (1965).
27 Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Schneider v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 266 F. Supp. 115 (D.C. Nebr. 1967); Mitchell v. Miller, 26Conn. Sup. 142, 214 A. 2d 694 (1965); Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968); Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A. 2d 320 (1966).
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sense thereby imposing a duty on the manufacturer outside the contract
of sale and preempting the privity defense.'
Strict Liability in Tort
The most recently developed theory on which manufacturer liability
may rest is that described in section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of the Law of Torts. The section is entitled, "Special Liability of Seller of
Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer" and provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user
or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which
it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.2
It is apparent from subsection (2) that this theory of liability is
intended to be differentiated from the theories of negligence and warranty.
The plaintiff's burden is to prove that he was a user or consumer, that the
product was defective, that such defect existed at the time the manu-
facturer sold or transferred the product, that the defective condition
rendered the product unreasonably dangerous, -and that the defective
condition was the proximate cause of the physical harm or injury to his
person or property. Privity of contract or degree of care is not in issue.
The Restatement takes no position with reference to whether the
stated rules apply to injuries incurred by other persons than users
or consumers or to manufacturers who supply their product to other
manufacturers for assembly into a finished product.
30 These aspects
will be examined later.
28 Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A. 2d 919 (D.C. Mun. App.
1962); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E. 2d
612 (1958); O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 125 Vt. 158, 212 A. 2d 69 (1965).
29This section appeared for the first time in the Restatement (Second) of Torts in
1965. A draft of the section was first presented to the American Law Institute by
William Prosser in 1961. See 38 A.L.I. Proceedings 50-61 (1961). For a review of the
promulgation of this section, see Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A
and the Uniorm Commercial Code, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 713 (1970).
30 Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), Caveat to 402A.
143
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One of the key interpretive problems with the section is ascribing
meaning to the words "defective condition." The comments to section
402A indicate "defective condition" includes improper packaging, 31
improper directions and inadequate warnings.3 2
Also of importance is the explanation the comments offer of the
term "user." The term is defined to include those who are passively
enjoying the benefits of the product, as passengers in automobiles
or airplanes, or those who may be performing work on the product, as
a mechanic working on an automobile.33
The comments to the section also make it clear that its provisions are
not governed by the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. 34
Hence, this liability is not affected by any contractual limitations affecting
the scope or content of warranties or by any disclaimers. However, the
observation is made in the comments that a number of courts have
treated the rule stated in the section as a matter of "warranty." The
implication is that when "warranty" is used in a tort sense the elements
of liability are those appearing in section 402A. Unfortunately, such is
not necessarily the case. It is true that where courts have characterized
"warranty" as tortious in nature, a concept of strict liability is present.
However, the elements of the liability differ, at least theoretically, from
section 402A. These differences must be kept in mind. When warranty
sounding in tort is in issue, resort is often made to the Uniform
Commercial Code to define the nature of the warranties. The plaintiff
must allege more than just a defective product. He must allege facts
which give rise to the warranty and describe the type of warranty, either
express or implied. If the action is based on an express warranty or theimplied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, the reliance on
the warranty must be shown as an inducement for the sale. The defect,
again in theory, need not be unreasonably dangerous but must merely
reflect a breach of the warranty. Thus, a warranted product may be
unmerchantable or unfit for a particular purpose and give rise to a cause
of action based on warranty sounding in tort but if the product is not
unreasonably dangerous in its defective condition no cause of action
would exist under section 402A. The remainder of the plaintiff's burden
is to show the breach of warranty, its casual connection to the injury,
and the injury.
Summary
A manufacturer's product liability may be based on negligence,
31 Id., Comment g.
32 Id., Comment i.
3 Id., Comment 1.
34 Id., Comment m.
Sping 1971
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warranty arising from contract or a concept of strict liability. These
theories differ in their underlying policy and in the elements necessary
for the imposition of liability. An insight into their application and
development may be gained by examining the evolution of the law
in a given jurisdiction. Ohio has been selected for this purpose. It is an
industrial state and the Supreme Court of Ohio has formulated significant
product liability decisions.35
III. THE MANUFACTURER AND PRODUCT
LIABILITY IN OHIO
The law as it existed in the mid 1920's, some forty years prior to the
decision in Lonzrick v. Republic Steel,36 has been selected as the point of
departure for a review of the developments of the law of product liability
in Ohio. The concept of strict product liability was nonexistent at that
time. Negligence and warranty were the operable theories upon which a
manufacturer's liability might rest. Warranty liability rested upon the
provisions of the Uniform Sales Act which had been enacted by the state
in 1908.37 This act provided that any affirmation of fact or any promise
relating to the goods created an express warranty if the natural tendency
of such affirmation or promise was to induce the buyer to purchase the
goods. Sales by description or sample gave rise to the implied warranty
that the goods would correspond with the description or sample. The act
described the conditions that would give rise to the implied warranties of
quality or fitness for a particular purpose. The beneficiaries of these
warranties were those persons in privity of contract with the manu-
facturer. The general rule at that time was that a negligence suit also
required that the plaintiff be in privity of contract with the tortfeasor.
With this state of the law the manufacturer was well insulated from
direct actions by consumers or users.
A major change in the law emerged from a decision by the Court
of Appeals for Lucas County in 1927.38 A sewing machine was sold to
the mother of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was allegedly injured through a
defect in the insulation of an electric cord. The defendant asked for a
directed verdict in the trial court on the basis of the general rule that
a manufacturer is not liable for negligence to a third person with whom
35Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corporation, 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E. 2d 185
(1966); Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E. 2d 583 (1965);
Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E. 2d 612 (1958).
36 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E. 2d 185 (1966).
37199 Ohio Laws 413 (1908), repealed and superceded on July 1, 1962 by Ohio
Revised Code sections 1302.01 through 1302.98, Ohio's version of the Uniform
Commercial Code Article 2.
38 White Sewing Machine Co. v. Feisel, 28 Ohio App. 152, 162 N.E. 633 (1927).
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he has no contractual relations. The court cited the decision in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company 9 as the applicable law. In so
doing, it declared that privity of contract was not necessary to hold a
manufacturer liable for negligence when the manufactured product was
"inherently" or "imminently" dangerous and the manufacturer knows
that the product will be used by persons other than the purchaser.
Foreseeability and the nature of the product became determinants of
liability for negligence rather than privity of contract.
Three months later the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County
reviewed a suit against a bakery brought by a purchaser from a retail
store for injuries caused by a needle imbedded in a cake.10 The bases
of the suit against the manufacturer were negligence and implied warranty
of wholesomeness. The negligence cause of action could be sustained
without privity following the rationale of the White Sewing Machine
Company case. With reference to the implied warranty cause of action
and the privity issue, the court observed,
... there being no direct authority in Ohio covering a case exactly
like the case at bar, we find ourselves on virgin territory and are
free to resort to our own processes of reasoning and consideration
of the demands of justice.41
The court proceeded to hold that the manufacturer of the food product,
by delivering it for sale to the public, impliedly represented to the public
that the cake was free of injurious substances and fit for consumption.
Further, the manufacturer knew the product was intended for the
consumer and not the retailer, and the implied obligation running to
the retailer must also have been intended to benefit of the consumer. In
other words, the consumer was a third party beneficiary of the contract
between the manufacturer and the retailer and the manufacturer's warran-
ty with reference to food products runs in favor of the ultimate consumer.
Although the plaintiff was allowed to pursue the warranty without being
directly in privity, the contractual nature of warranty liability was
preserved by characterizing the consumer as a third party beneficiary.
Also of interest in this case was the court's holding that the presence of
the needle in the case was an evidential fact from which negligence might
be inferred. Anticipating future developments, the court may have been
saying that the same evidence was proof of a "defective product."
In a similar food case reaching the Supreme Court of Ohio in 1935,4
the plaintiffs pressed their case on the basis of negligence rather than a
39217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
40 Ward Baking Company v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
4Ild., at 481,161 N.E. at 559.
4 Canton Provision Company v. Gauder, 130 Ohio St. 43, 196 N.E. 634 (1935).
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third party beneficiary concept. The Supreme Court specifically asserted
that privity of contract is not an essential element of liability where
unwholesome food is involved. Such a product would be "imminently
dangerous" and within the rule laid down in the White Sewing Machine
Company case. The Supreme Court again emphasized the contract
nature of warranty liability in its dicta by stating that an implied warranty
requires a meeting of the minds the same as does an express contract,
and since there was no privity of contract in this case, any liability
must therefore be in tort not contract.
Approximately three years later, the Supreme Court had the
opportunity to express itself again concerning the relationship between
the contract and tort liability of a seller of goods.43 The product involved
was hair dye which proved injurious to the purchaser. The plaintiff
asserted her claim on the theories of breach of warranty and negligence.
The lower court ruled the evidence insufficient to support a breach of
warranty suit and proceeded to try the case on the basis of negligence.
The court of appeals reversed the lower court for the reason, among
others, that the lower court charged on the issue of negligence instead of
confining the case to the issue of implied warranty. To reconcile this
dilemma, the Supreme Court held that in selling a product the seller owes
a duty beyond the mere contract. There is an obligation that the goods
will be fit for the particular purpose intended and a further duty to refrain
from including therein any danger unknown to the buyer. The first duty
is imposed by contract and the second, by tort law. Circumstances which
constitute a breach of warranty may also constitute negligence. The
Supreme Court ruled the plaintiff could have introduced evidence of a
breach of warranty or negligence and since a charge of negligence alone
was not prejudicial to the defendant the finding for the plaintiff was
allowed to stand. If the breach of warranty issue had been pursued
the privity question was attacked by an allegation that the immediate
seller was the agent of the defendant-distributor.
Another method of satisfying the privity of contract requirement was
through statutory construction of the word "buyer," as in Tennebaum v.
Pendergast,44 a case decided in the Common Pleas Court of Franklin
County in 1948. A carbonated beverage bottle exploded and injured the
wife of the buyer. As a defense to the implied warranty allegation,
the manufacturer pleaded lack of privity. The court looked to the
definition of "buyer" appearing in the Uniform Sales Act as adopted by
Ohio. The statutory definition of "buyer" included the person who
buys or any legal successor of such person. The court ruled that the
legislature intended to benefit not only the buyer but also his successor
43 Sicard v. Kremer, 133 Ohio St. 291, 13 N.E. 2d 250 (1938).
4455 Ohio L. Abs. 231, 90 N.E. 2d 453 (Ohio C.P. 1948).
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in interest and in this case there was at least a "gift by implication" of
the product to the wife. Therefore, she was within the class intended
to be protected by the implied warranty.
The contractual nature of a warranty action and the requirements
of privity of contract were well-entrenched principles in Ohio law. The
Court of Appeals for Hamilton County in reviewing a case in which
a subpurchaser brought suit against a manufacturer on the basis of a
breach of an express warranty5 asserted unequivocally,
There is no privity between the plaintiff and the defendants, and
such privity is necessary to sustain an action based upon an express
warranty.4
The court noted that there were limited exceptions to this rule appearing
throughout the states where injury to the person was involved but not
where property damage was the only claimed injury. Without privity,
pursuit of the manufacturer must be on the basis of negligence.
Judge Mathews dissented to the privity holding. The express war-
ranty was on the cans of antifreeze and were relied on by the ultimate
consumer. His contention was that it was logical to assume that the
warranties were made to the ultimate consumer who would be the only
person to suffer from any breach. This affirmation of facts made directly
to the consumer by the manufacturer created privity between them. Of
interest is the insistence on the contract nature of warranty and the
efforts made to supply privity.
The privity requirement under the negligence theory in Ohio came to
the attention of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1946.47 The
defendant had manufactured an ash hopper and an ash grate for use with
a large boiler. The failure of this equipment produced personal injuries
to an employee of the purchaser. The federal court stated that although
generally the manufacturer of an article is not liable in negligence
to third parties who have no contractual relations with him, an act
of negligence "imminently dangerous" to life or health is actionable.
The court found lacking evidence that the product involved was
"imminently dangerous" at the time of fabrication and installation
or that it was "inherently dangerous"; therefore, the general rule
requiring privity precluded liability.
The privity requirement in product liability cases was troublesome
for the trial courts. The Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County
decision in Mahoney v. Shaker Square Beverage, Inc.48 reflects the conflict
45 Jordan v. Brouwer, 86 Ohio App. 505, 93 N.E. 2d 49 (1949).
4.d. at 511, 93 N.E. 2d at 52. The court cited 46 Am. Jur. Sales § 306 as the basisfor this position.
47 Schindley v. Allen-Sherman-Hoff Co., 157 F. 2d 102 (6th Cir. 1946).
4864 Ohio L. Abs. 200, 102 N.E. 2d 281 (Ohio C.P. 1951).
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between the desire of the court to protect the innocent plaintiff and the
privity rule. A personal servant, an employee of the purchaser, was
injured by an exploding bottle of ale. The issues in the case were whether
or not the implied warranty of the seller extended to the bottle and
whether or not, if such warranty existed, it extended to the employee of
the purchaser. Although the defendant in this case was not a manufac-
turer, any extension of warranty protection beyond the purchaser would
be relevant to the manufacturer's position in a sales transaction. The
court resolved the first issue by holding that the implied warranty of
merchantability extended to the bottle, not just the ale, since there was
such a close relationship between the package and the product. Further,
the defect in the bottle was construed as creating an adulterated product
under the Ohio pure food laws.49 As to the privity issue, the court
reviewed the decisions under the Ohio pure food laws wherein the term
"buyer" was interpreted to include members of the buyer's family and
guests in his household. The conclusion was reached that an action for
breach of implied warranty is available to a member of the household of
the purchaser. At the time of this trial court decision, there was no precise
precedent for the omission of privity in an implied warranty suit.
The same trial court, the day after its decision in the above case, was
called upon to rule on a motion to strike a cause of action based on
warranty where an employee of the purchaser was fatally injured by a
disintegrating grinding wheel.50 The specific issue was whether or not the
warranty extended to the employee. The court reasoned the product's
defective construction made it imminently dangerous for its intended use
and this constituted a violation of the duty owed by the manufacturer
to the public. The dicta in the opinion reflected confusion surrounding
the various theories of liability. Again, at the time, the Supreme Court
of Ohio had not overruled the general rule requiring privity in implied
warranty suits.
In 1952, in an action by a purchaser against a soap manufacturer for
injuries sustained from a wire embedded in a bar of soap,51 the Court of
Appeals for Cuyahoga County ruled directly on the availability of an
implied warranty action without privity. The court observed,
The cases dealing with the right of an ultimate consumer to maintain
an action for breach of warranty against the manufacturer when the
49 81 Ohio Laws 67 (1884). Amended repeatedly, 97 Ohio Laws 116 (1904), 98 Ohio
Laws 263 (1906), 99 Ohio Laws 257 (1908), 100 Ohio Laws 105 (1909), 108
Ohio Laws Pt. I 15 (1919), 112 Ohio Laws 135 (1927), 117 Ohio Laws 157 (1937),
119 Ohio Laws 670 (1941), 120 Ohio Laws 255 (1943), repealed 127 Ohio Laws 835
(1957), now presently encompassed in Chapter 3715 of the Ohio Revised Code.
50 DiVello v. Gardner Machine Co., 65 Ohio L. Abs. 58, 102 N.E. 2d 289 (Ohio
C. P. 1951).
51 Krupar v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 113 N.E. 2d 605 (Ohio App. 1953).
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goods are brought from a retail dealer are in hopeless confusion.
The ground usually advanced for not permitting such an action
is because there is no contractual relations between the ultimate
consumer and the manufacturer.
52
The court then held,
The question of privity should not protect one who sells unmerchant-
able goods where inspection will not disclose the defect.53
Therefore, according to the appellate court, at least the ultimate purchaser
should be permitted to bring a warranty action directly against the
manufacturer. On review, the Supreme Court preempted this determi-
nation by finding that the trial court had charged the jury on negligence
and the appellate court improperly addressed itself to the issue of implied
warranty. 54 The trial court had permitted the jury to consider the issue of
negligence where the only evidence of the negligence of the defendant was
the partly used bar of soap, the piece of wire, and a discolored slit in the
soap the size of the wire. The issue was submitted under the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur. The Supreme Court held that the operative facts did not
support invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur since the product had
been out of the control of the defendant for an appreciable time and
had been handled by several persons after it left the control of the
defendant. Final judgment, therefore, was rendered for the manufacturer.
In 1953, the Supreme Court ruled directly on the need for privity in
an implied warranty action in Wood v. General Electric Co. Although
some trial and appellate courts in Ohio had either ruled or expressed in
dicta that the implied warranties should run for the benefit of the ultimate
consumer, the high court ruled otherwise. The plaintiff had purchased an
electric blanket manufactured by the defendant. The allegations were that
defects made the blanket inherently dangerous and that General Electric
breached the implied warranty of merchantability proximately causing
extensive property damage and loss of rental income. Negligence in manu-
facture was also alleged. The court ruled that although a subpurchaser of
an inherently dangerous article may recover from its manufacturer for
negligence, no action may be maintained against such manufacturer by a
subpurchaser for damages based upon an implied warranty. To support
such an action there must be privity of contract between the seller and the
buyer. The court was not impressed with the sympathy of the lower
courts for the ultimate consumer. Four years later in a suit against a
retailer, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that the implied
warranties are not available to a person who is not in privity of contract
52 Id. at 607.
53 Id. at 608.
4  Krupar v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 160 Ohio St. 489, 117 N.E. 2d 7 (1954).
55 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E. 2d 8 (1953).
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with the seller.56 In that instance, the wife of the purchaser was precluded
from recovering on the theory of implied warranty.
Before proceeding, a summary of the Ohio law as it had developed
to 1957 would be appropriate. The two theories of manufacturers'
liability were negligence and warranty. The warranty action could not be
pursued without privity of contract. Negligence suits were permissible
without privity of contract when the product involved was inherently
dangerous or imminently so as a result of the negligence of the manufac-
turer. Otherwise, in negligence cases, privity was also necessary. Thus, at
the time, a manufacturer could be pursued by the ultimate consumer
only on the basis of negligence and this cause of action required that
the product be inherently or imminently dangerous because of the
acts of the manufacturer.
It was against this background that the Supreme Court of Ohio issued
its landmark decision in Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.57 This
opinion began the erosion of the legal insulation provided manufacturers
against suits by ultimate consumers and other members of the public.
The plaintiff had suffered personal injuries from the use of a home
permanent. Suit was initiated against the manufacturer on the theories
of negligence, breach of express warranty, and breach of implied
warranty. In the form the case reached the Supreme Court, the issue
presented was whether an ultimate consumer could proceed directly
against the manufacturer on the theory of express warranty or whether
the action must be based on negligence. Wood v. General Electric58 was
cited for the necessity of privity in a warranty action.
The court carefully explained that the term "warranty" historically
had its foundation in tort law and was in the nature of a deceit action
which presents no privity obstacles. Attention was directed to current
marketing practices whereby manufacturers make extensive use of media
to advertise their products, ship their products in sealed packages, and
utilize the retailers as mere conduits to the ultimate consumer. The
court observed that members of the public often rely exclusively on
the representations of the manufacturer in determining their purchases.
The warranties made by the manufacturer in his advertisements and on
his product's label serve as inducements. Therefore, reasoned the court,
the consumer who buys relying on such representations should have
recourse to the manufacturer if the product is not as represented and
causes injury. Privity, it was held, is not required in an action for breach
56 Welsh v. Ledyard, 167 Ohio St. 57, 146 N.E. 2d 299 (1957).
57 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E. 2d 612 (1958).
58 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E. 2d 8 (1953).
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of an express warranty sounding in tort. The express warranty action
was characterized as tortious in nature not contractual.
The court drew a distinction between an express and an implied
warranty observing that the latter arises by implication of law, rather
than from any affirmations of the manufacturer. By so doing, it was not
necessary to overrule Wood v. General Electric Co.59 Hence, privity
remained a requirement where implied warranties were in issue but not
if express warranties sounding in tort were alleged. The opportunity
for direct actions against manufacturers increased accordingly.
Three of the seven justices took exception to the imposition of tort
liability on a manufacturer through the vehicle of a warranty when the
manufacturer was innocent of any dishonesty, bad faith, negligence or
other fault in making the affirmation constituting such warranty. If the
manufacturer was careless in his declarations or knew of any deficiencies,
the necessary scienter could be found to support a deceit action. On the
other hand, if the malfeasance consisted of not being aware of what
he should be aware of, the manufacturer's liability should be founded
in negligence. The majority opinion decided that scienter was not
necessary to impose express warranty liability.
Three months later the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County
reviewed a case wherein the trial court had awarded a directed verdict
after the plaintiff's presentation of his evidence.6 0 The plaintiff based the
suit on negligence, breach of an express warranty and breach of an
implied warranty. The product was a home permanent whose use
produced personal injuries. The appeal placed in issue the appropriateness
of the trial court's conduct in preempting the jury. One determination
by the Court of Appeals was that under the rationale of the Rogers
v. Toni Home Permanent Co. case, 61 the express warranty issue should
have gone to the jury. Of more significance was its finding with reference
to the negligence and implied warranty issues. As to negligence, the court
observed that when a manufacturer markets an inherently dangerous
product and the purchaser's evidence shows that use of the product
according to directions proximately caused the injuries, it is sufficient
to permit the case to go to the jury on the issue of negligence. The
court did not mention res ipsa loquitur or the necessity of showing
how the defendant may have failed to exercise ordinary care under
the circumstances. Such evidence would not seem to present any issue
of negligence to the jury.
The second significant ruling in the case was the court's conclusion
59 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E. 2d 8 (1953).
60 Markovich v. McKesson and Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E. 2d 181(1958).
61 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E. 2d 612 (1958).
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that the issue of implied warranty could go to the jury without the need
of showing privity as required by the Supreme Court decision in Wood
v. General Electric2 and Welsh v. Ledyard.63 In Rogers v. Toni Home
Permanent Co., the Supreme Court had indicated a willingness to
reexamine the Wood v. General Electric64 decision if a similar case was
brought to it. The Court of Appeals cited the original tort nature of
warranty and asserted that where a manufacturer makes express
representations the intent is not to contract eo instanti. Rather, the intent
is to induce a bargain and it is the inducing representations that serve as
the basis of liability, not the contract. Further, where the manufacturer
induces the sale of a product by advertisements urging its use, there is an
implied warranty that such product is of merchantable quality and privity
should not be a bar to an action based on this implied warranty.
Subsequent to the Markovich v. McKesson and Robbins decision,
65
an interesting application of Ohio law was made by the Court of Appeals
for Lucas County. 6  A purchaser of a new automobile brought suit on the
basis of an implied warranty that the automobile was fit and proper for
transportation purposes. It was alleged that the manufacturer represented
and implicitly warranted the product was in good condition, mechanically
fit, free from defects and would give proper service. Monetary damages
only were sought. To cope with the legal dilemma presented by the
Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., Wood v. General Electric, and
the Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins cases, the court liberally
construed the pleadings as stating a cause of action for breach of an
express as well as an implied warranty. This interpretation was given
even though counsel for the plaintiff asserted the plaintiff was relying
for recovery on breach of an implied warranty. The court's interpretation
enabled it to overrule the demurrer of the manufacturer on the basis
of lack of privity, thereby avoiding the issue of whether or not privity
was required where an implied warranty was in issue.
Six months later, the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County ruled
directly on the issue of privity in implied warranty actions and held
that Wood v. General Electric Co. "completely settled" the question.
61
This same court reaffirmed its position in 1962 in Miller v. Chrysler
Motor Corporation,68 specifically rejecting the argument of the plaintiff
that privity was not necessary since historically a warranty action is
one in tort, not in contract.
62 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E. 2d 8 (1953).
63 167 Ohio St. 57, 146 N.E. 2d299 (1957).
64 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E. 2d 8 (1953).
65 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E. 2d 181 (1958).
66 Lewis v. VinDevers Mercury, Inc., 111 Ohio App. 455, 173 N.E. 2d 145 (1959).
67 Kemedy v. Beauty Products, Inc., 112 Ohio App. 505, 167 N.E. 2d 116 (1960).
68 90 Ohio L. Abs. 317, 183 N.E. 2d 421 (1962).
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At this point, Ohio enacted the Uniform Commercial Code69
containing the previously discussed provisions regarding types of
warranties, their exclusions and limitations, and the beneficiaries of
these warranties.70 The Code left the judiciary free to develop the
law regarding the extension of warranties beyond the immediate
purchaser, his family, members of his household or guests in his home.
Early in the same year, 1962, Justice Traynor speaking for the
Supreme Court of California issued his landmark opinion in Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.n This case is recognized as the first
to expound the theory of a manufacturer's strict liability in tort. The
case influenced the ultimate provisions of section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.
In Greenman, the manufacturer was pursued by a user of a power
tool who had received it as a gift from his wife. The evidence indicated
defective design and construction. The theories of liability against the
manufacturer were negligence, breach of express warranty and breach of
implied warranties. The defendant contended that the injured person had
not given it notice of any warranty breach within a reasonable time after
the injury as required by the Uniform Sales Act of California. The court
asserted that the warranties involved were not those arising from the
sales contract but were those arising from the common law decisions
imposing warranties independently of the contract of sale. Hence, the
statutory notice requirement was not applicable. Of greater significance
in the case, however, was Justice Traynor's pronouncement:
Moreover, to impose strict liability on the manufacturer under the
circumstances of this case, it was not necessary for plaintiff to
establish an express warranty.... A manufacturer is strictly liable in
tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to
be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that
causes injury to a human being.7
Anticipating confusion with the use of the word "warranty" to define
such liability Justice Traynor continued:
Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the
theory of an express or implied warranty running from the manufac-
turer to the plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a
69 129 Ohio Laws 13 (1961) effective July 1, 1962 and appearing in the Ohio Revised
Code as Chapters 1301 through 1309.
70At the time of its adoption by Ohio, the Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-318, did
not offer alternatives. Hence, Ohio incorporated the then Uniform provision extending
the warranties to members of the buyer's family or household or guests in his home
if it was reasonable to expect that such persons would use, consume or be affected by
the goods. In this form, this section is mainly applicable to retailers not manufac-
turers. OhiD Rev. Code, § 1302.31 (1962).
71 59 Cal. : d 57, 377 P. 2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
72 Id. at 60, 377 P. 2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
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contract between them, the recognition that the liability is not
assumed by agreement but imposed by law (citing cases), and the
refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its own
responsibility for defective products (citing cases) make clear that
the liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties
but by the law of strict liability in tort.73
The Ohio courts and the federal courts applying Ohio law, however,
continued to require privity in implied warranty cases.
74
In 1964, the American Law Institute approved the present text of
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Tortsm and the section
was published in 1965.76 Its publication and the judicial reinforcement77
of the concept that followed, placed the theory on the horizon of the
law of product liability in Ohio.
The Ohio Supreme Court spoke again in Inglis v. American
Motors.78 The purchaser of an automobile alleged he was induced by the
express warranties of the manufacturer to make the purchase. The
warranties were made via mass communications and represented that the
manufacturer's cars were free from defects. A claim under the implied
warranties of fitness and merchantability was also asserted as well as
negligence in not discovering the defects. The manufacturer demurred to
all three causes of action and was supported by the trial court. Signifi-
cantly, the plaintiff was asking for only monetary damages measured
by the diminution in the value of the car. Citing the Rogers v. Toni Home
Permanent Co. case, which involved personal injury, the court overruled
the demurrer to the express warranty allegations. The effect was to hold
that such an action will lie without privity where the only loss is
monetary. The implied warranty allegations were found to be congruent
with the express warranty claim and therefore no need to rule specifically
on the implied warranty issue was present. The demurrer to the
negligence claim was sustained with the holding that mere pecuniary
loss of bargain must be recovered on contract not tort.
Summary
In Ohio, as the law developed through 1965, the manufacturer was
susceptible to being pursued by at least the purchaser on the theory of
73 Id. at 61, 377 P. 2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
74Yount v. Positive Safety Mfg. Co., 319 F. 2d 324 (6th Cir. 1963); Tonile v. New
York Central RR Co., 234 F. Supp. 101 (N.D. Ohio 1964), Miller v. Chrysler Corp.,
90 Ohio L. Abs. 317, 183 N.E. 2d 421 (1962).
7541 A.L.I. Proceedings 349 (1964).
76 Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965).
77 Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A. 2d 189 (1965), Suvada v. White Motor
Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E. 2d 182 (1965), Dealers Transportation Co. v. Battery
Distribution Co., 402 S.W. 2d 441 (Kentucky 1965), Santor v. Karagheusian, Inc.,
44 N.J. 52, 207 A. 2d 305 (1965).
78 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E. 2d 583 (1965).
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negligence or breach of express warranty. To pursue the negligence suit
the non-privity plaintiff would have to show that the product was either
inherently or imminently dangerous in the condition it was in when it left
the manufacturer. Suits founded on negligence were allowed in cases
involving a variety of products, e.g., those intended for personal use or
consumption, machinery, electric products and automobiles. Persons
whose association with the product had been foreseeable, e.g., the
purchaser, the subpurchaser, a family member of the purchaser, or
employee of the purchaser, were permitted to bring an action alleging
negligence. Personal injury losses or injury to property were recoverable.
An action based on express warranty, where it was characterized as
sounding in tort, no longer required a showing of privity where the injury
was to the person or when a diminution in the value of the product was
the injury. Although no cases appeared on the point, it could reasonably
be concluded that damage to property would also be recoverable in such
an action. Such a suit was available at least to the purchaser, a sub-
purchaser, or a user. The Uniform Commercial Code extended the express
contractual warranty benefits described in the Code to the family members
of the purchaser, members of his household or guests in his home. The
express warranty action encompassed the whole spectrum of products.
The implied warranty action required privity except to the extent of
those beneficiaries enumerated in the Uniform Commercial Code. The
lower courts' willingness to eliminate the privity requirement was rejected
by the Supreme Court. The plaintiff had to be in privity with the seller or
successfully urge a legal theory that would place him in privity. For
example, the plaintiff might show that he was intended to be third party
beneficiary of the sales agreement, that the seller was an agent of the
manufacturer, or that he was a successor in interest of the buyer. The
implied warranty action also encompassed the whole spectrum of products
and recovery could be had for personal injuries or damage to property.
Thus, the product liability law of Ohio evolved with an aspect of
"pidgeonholing." In order to determine the basis for a product liability
action, certain elements in the facts had to be "pidgeonholed." What
is the nature of the product? In what category is the plaintiff? Is he
a purchaser, user, employee of the purchaser, family member or
bystander? What type of injury is alleged? What theory or theories
of liability may be supported?
Yet to appear in Ohio was the concept of strict liability in tort.
IV. LONZRICK V. REPUBLIC STEEL CORPORATION
The Supreme Court of Ohio subscribed to the imposition of strict
product liability on manufacturers in Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp.,79
79 6 Ohio St 2d 227, 218 N.E. 2d 185 (1966).
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decided in June of 1966. This case is selected as a benchmark in this
article since it represents the most recent expansion of the law in
Ohio. Following an analysis of this case and its effect on Ohio law,
observations of recent developments outside of Ohio affecting the liability
of manufacturers will be made. Of particular interest will be the
identification of any tendency to limit this liability.
In the Lonzrick case, the plaintiff was an employee of a steel
erector firm. While engaged in his usual employment, steel roof joists
manufactured by the defendant collapsed causing personal injuries.
The manufacturer was pursued on an alleged breach of the implied
warranty that the roof joists were of good and merchantable quality.
When the cause was filed in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga
County, the defendant demurred to the petition. The trial court sustained
the demurrer on the rationale of Wood v. General Electrica° which
required privity in an implied warranty action. The plaintiff was an
employee of a subcontractor. The joists were purchased by the general
contractor. The plaintiff elected to stand on his pleadings and the matter
came before the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County for review.'1
The Court of Appeals, noting the change in marketing techniques
and citing cases from other jurisdictions, reversed the trial court. The
issue as the Court of Appeals described it was whether or not a duty,
apart from a contractual duty, had been breached. The manufacturer's
duty, in its view, was imposed by tort law. The duty the manufacturer
owes is to see that when the goods are used as intended there will be
no injury to others. Under this concept, the class to whom the manufac-
turer owes this duty is quite broad. Greenman v. Yuba Power82 was cited
for the explanation of why the implied warranty is one sounding in tort.
Several cases were cited as standing for the proposition that one,
apparently anyone, who is injured as a result of the use of a defective
product may look to the producer for redress without privity.83 The
court then characterized the case as based upon the theory of strict
tort liability and observed,
While the words "implied warranty" are used, they are intended to
mean and describe the duty and representation of a producer of
chattels to the buying public that the goods may be used for the
purposes intended without danger to the purchaser from latent
defects making their use dangerous to the user. The use of the word
80 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E. 2d 8 (1953).
81 Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 1 Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E. 2d 92 (1965).
82 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P. 2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
83Ross v. Phillip Morris and Co., Ltd., 328 F. 2d 3 (2nd Cir. 1964); Spence v. Three
Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W. 2d 873 (1958);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1963); Pabon v.
Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc., 63 N.J. Super 476, 164 A. 2d 773 (1960); General
Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W. 2d 655 (1960) et al.
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"warranty" is probably improper; however, the courts in describing
causes of action for strict .rt liability in product cases, seem to
have continued to use it for want of a better word, not intending it
to mean anything more than the manufacturer putting his goods into
the stream of commerce, thereby representing that they are of mer-
chantable quality, unless a different intention is clearly expressed.84
The Court of Appeals adopted the principles of section 402A. In its
decision the court enumerated three possible causes of action in a
products liability case-negligence, breach of warranties sounding in
contract, and strict liability in tort.
On review, the Supreme Court also enumerated three possible causes
of action in Ohio-negligence, breach of warranties sounding in contract,
and breach of implied warranties sounding in tort. It did not accept strict
tort liability in the same substantive form as the Court of Appeals. Rather
it described the third possible cause of action as one in tort based upon
the breach of a duty assumed by the manufacturer of a product, a duty
which arises from the implicit representation that the product is of mer-
chantable quality and fit for its intended use. This duty is breached when
a defect in the product causes injuries to a person whose presence could
reasonably be anticipated. To recover, the plaintiff must allege and prove
that a defect existed in the product manufactured and sold by the defend-
ant, that the defect existed at the time the product was sold by the defend-
ant, that the defect was the direct and proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries, and that the plaintiff, at the time he was injured, was in a place
where his presence was reasonably to be anticipated by the manufacturer.
The court acknowledged the confusion caused by using the word
"warranty" to describe a tort obligation. Although a warranty action
originally sounded in tort, the commercial world associates warranties
with contract. The Supreme Court, while taking due notice of this fact,
observed that this tort concept of warranty does not supercede or replace
any warranties arising from a contract of sale. The duty of the manu-
facturer imposed by tort now exists side by side with any contract
warranties. The beneficiaries of the warranties created by contract may
proceed on either the contract or tort aspect of the warranties, whereas
other persons must base their remedy on the tort concept of warranty.
Lonzrick was described as a "user" of the product. Since he was
working on the building utilizing the roof joists he might reasonably
be classified as a "passive user" within the context of Comment 1 to
section 402A, rather than a bystander. The court identified assumption
of risk and intervening cause as possible defenses. Four members of
the court joined in the majority opinion overruling the demurrer of the
manufacturer; three dissented.
84 1 Ohio App. 2d at 384, 205 N.E. 2d at 99.
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The dissent expressed the concern that the implied warranty in tort
theory of the majority made the manufacturer an unlimited insurer of any
damage proximately caused by a defect in his product. This would be
true, according to the dissent, even though no amount of care could have
eliminated the defect and even though no representations were made and
relied upon. Further, the majority emphasized the importance of a defect
and the petition did not allege a defect, but simply that the product was
"not of good and merchantable quality." These are not necessarily
identical conditions of the product. The roof joists could have been of
less weight bearing capacity than specified by the buyer and as a result
the implied warranty of merchantability, as defined in the Uniform
Commercial Code, would have been breached. However, the roof joists
would not have been "defective." If the petition had alleged a defective
condition existing when the product was sold by the defendant and
proximately causing the injury of the plaintiff, then a cause of action in
negligence could be sustained and the plaintiff would have the help of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Also, the prior Ohio cases, Rogers
v. Toni Home Permanent85 and Inglis v. American Motors,86 had stressed
reliance as a factor in warranty actions sounding in tort. No reliance
was alleged or apparent in this instance.
The minority emphasized the fact that the authorities cited by the
majority to sustain the implied warranty in tort theory were authorities
describing the strict liability concept in other jurisdictions. 87 The concept
of strict product liability exists in Ohio, according to the minority, by
statutory declaration as in the case of food products 8 The minority
recommended that any extension of strict product liability should be
made by the legislature.
The minority questioned the qualification of the court to fully
evaluate the factors involved in imposing strict liability on a manufacturer.
The usual argument in favor of the doctrine is to spread the risks of loss
over the community through the pricing policies of the producer. The
legislature, as opposed to a court, is in a position to conduct hearings to
85 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E. 2d 612 (1958).
883 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E. 2d 583 (1965).
87 The majority cited the following authorities: Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P. 2d 897 (1963); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.
2d 256, 391 P. 2d 168 (1964); Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A. 2d 189
(1965); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E. 2d 182 (1965); Spence
v. Three Rivers Bldg. & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W. 2d 873
(1958); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W. 2d 129
(1965); Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W. 2d 41 (Mo. 1963); Santor v.
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A. 2d 305 (1965); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck
Leasing and Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A. 2d 769 (1965); Goldberg v.
Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y. 2d 432, 191 N.E. 2d 81 (1963); Marathon
Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P. 2d 900 (Okla. 1965); Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc.,
405 P. 2d 624 (Ore. 1965); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W. 2d 240 (Tenn. 1966).
88See Ohio Rev. Code, § 3715.52 (1964).
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determine the availability of insurance to producers to protect against this
liability or to determine other means of distributing the costs among the
public. The legislature could also evaluate the potential adverse affect on
desirable activity and how a manufacturer might afford such protection.
The dissent also noted that since the decisions in Rogers v. Toni
Home Permanent,8 9 Wood v. General Electric,"0 and Welsh v. Ledyard,91
the Ohio Legislature had enacted the Uniform Commercial Code. Section
2-31892 of the Code extended the seller's warranties to any natural
person who is in the family or household of the buyer or who is a guest
in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use,
consume, or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by
breach of the warranty. The effect of this legislation, argued the minority,
was to overrule Welsh v. Ledyard93 involving a retailer but approve Wood
v. General Electric Co.94 case requiring privity with a manufacturer. The
dissent referred to Comment 3 to section 2-318 which indicates that
a seller's warranties shall not extend to a person who is not "in the
distribution chain."
Judge Schneider, a dissenting Justice, noted that the basic difference
between the majority and the minority of the court was the acceptance
of the concept of imposing legal liability without consideration of any
standard of care. Judge Schneider concluded,
If the plaintiff should succeed in laying the defect which proximately
caused his injury at the door of defendant's place of business, the
defendant will be permitted no explanation of any transaction
occurring therein, including that which might tend to show that
every precaution known to man was exercised to prevent the
occurrence of the claimed defect.95
In Lonzrick, did Ohio adopt the concept of strict product liability
described in section 402A? The Court of Appeals expressly approved the
section as the basis for its decision. The dissenting Justices of the Supreme
Court suggested the majority by reference had adopted the doctrine
although the cause was characterized as arising from warranty. However,
the majority opinion did not mention the doctrine but deliberately
eliminated it in the enumeration of the legal theories available in Ohio
substituting instead the theory of breach of implied warranty sounding
in tort. Is this a meaningful distinction?
Some differences are apparent. Section 402A liability is imposed
89 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E. 2d 612 (1958).
90 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E. 2d 8 (1953).
91 167 Ohio St. 57, 146 N.E. 2d 299 (1957).
92 Ohio Rev. Code, § 1302.31 (1962).
93 167 Ohio St. 57, 146 N.E. 2d 299 (1957).
94 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E. 2d 8 (1953).
95 6 Ohio St. 2d at 252,218 N.E. 2d at 201.
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upon a seller who sells a defective product in the ordinary course of
business. The Lonzrick opinion repeatedly limits the liability described
therein to a seller who is a manufacturer. The legal position of the
intermediaries under the implied warranty theory is not defined. The
liability of the retailer, wholesaler or distributor must remain on the basis
of contractual warranties, negligence or breach of an express warranty
sounding in tort where reliance is an essential element.
Another variance relates to the type of injury for which recovery
may be had. Section 402A extends its provisions to users or consumers
whose person or property is injured. The implied warranty in the
Lonzrick decision was applied to permit recovery for personal injuries.
However, it can be expected that the Supreme Court will parallel its
decisions in regard to express warranties and extend the manufacturer's
liability to property damages and, perhaps, to monetary losses.
Section 402A is available to a consumer or user, the latter term being
broadly defined. The Supreme Court decision permits suit by a person
whose presence was in a place the manufacturer could reasonably
anticipate. On the surface, an implied warranty action appears to be
available to a larger class of persons.
The major deviation from section 402A occurs in the type of defect
that must exist. The Restatement provides that the defective product must
be unreasonably dangerous whereas the Lonzrick opinion imposes liability
where the product is not fit for its ordinary intended purpose. It would
appear that the burden of proof regarding the defect would be greater
under section 402A. A product that is defective under section 402A
would also be defective in the sense that it would not be fit for its
ordinary intended purpose. However, a product that is not fit for its
intended purpose and thus defective under Lonzrick, would not necessarily
be unreasonably dangerous. Hence, it would seem that a manufacturer's
liability may be broader in scope under the warranty theory.
The other elements of section 402A are similar to the elements of
the implied warranty theory described in Lonzrick. The common aspects
are (1) all products are encompassed, (2) the product must be defective,
(3) the defect must have existed at the time the product left the control
of the defendant, (4) the product must have been being used as intended,
(5) the defect must have proximately caused the injury, (6) liability may
result although all possible care has been exercised in the preparation and
sale of the product, and (7) privity of contract need not be present.
Even though the Supreme Court of Ohio refrained from adopting
in total the legal principles of section 402A, the above comparison
indicates that Ohio subscribes to a concept of imposing strict liability on
a manufacturer. Indeed, in a subsequent case, an appellate court cited
Lonzrick as introducing strict product liability in Ohio.96 Irrespective of
96 Groves v. Petroleum Co., 22 Ohio App. 2d 25, 257 N.E. 2d 759 (1969).
27
Jenkins: Product Liability
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1972
4 AKRON LAW REVIEW (2)
its historical correctness, the court would be well advised to abandon
the use of the term "warranty" to describe this liability. The recent use
of the word has been associated more closely to contract liability. For
clarity "warranty" should be reserved to describe the contractual liabilitics
imposed by the Uniform Commercial Code. These contractual warranties
could be extended, if deemed appropriate, to other members of the
distributive chain by judicial decision or legislative enactment.
The Lonzrick decision represents the furthermost reach of the
law of product liability as it applies to manufacturers in Ohio. For
understanding purposes, the law of Ohio has been briefly traced from
the time the manufacturer was shielded by the need for privity in both
tort and contract actions. What has occurred in Ohio is representative
of the development of product liability law in those jurisdictions that
presently subscribe to strict liability. Section 402A was published in
1965 and Lonzrick decided in 1966. What has occurred in the past
few years? Has section 402A been controlling and significant in strict
liability jurisdictions? Have new principles appeared? Has the recent
trend been to broaden or limit a manufacturer's liability?
To this point, achieving an understanding of the theories of
product liability, their development and interrelationship has been the
objective. With this background, the intent is to explore the above
questions and others as reflected by the decisions appearing throughout
the United States since Lonzrick.
V. PRODUCT LIABILITY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE LONZRICK
The development of the law of product liability in Ohio is repre-
sentative of the developmental pattern in the several states. Initially, lack
of privity precluded warranty or negligence actions directly against the
manufacturer. Privity as an essential element was eliminated first in
negligence proceedings. Subsequently, privity disappeared in warranty
actions where the seller had made representations in the nature of
express warranties to the purchasers of his product. Eventually, privity
disappeared in suits based upon implied warranty as defined in the
statutory law of contracts for the sale of goods. As the injured party
became further removed from the sales contract, the courts became
uncomfortable with the extension of contract rights to remote parties and
commenced to characterize warranty actions as sounding in tort. A theory
of manufacturer's liability to remote parties sounding in tort evolved
divorced from warranty and its contractual aspects. This theory of
liability was described as strict liability for the sale of defective products.
The elements of this theory were set forth in section 402A of The
Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts. The several states are in
various stages in the development of this rapidly changing area of the
law. Some states have yet to subscribe to imposing tort liability on
162 Spring 1971
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the manufacturer without some degree of fault and impose tort liability
on the basis of negligence.97 Four states, including Ohio, subscribe to the
concept of strict liability, employ the rationale of section 402A, but treat
the basis of liability as "warranty" sounding in tort.98 Tennessee favors
section 402A but still uses warranty terminology and distinguishes implied
warranties as envisioned by section 402A99 from the implied warranties
described in the Uniform Commercial Code. Currently, courts in
twenty-one states have accepted the concept of strict tort liability as
defined in section 402A.100 In addition, four federal district courts and
four federal courts of appeal, in the absence of precedent in six states,
applied section 402A as the probable state law governing the case. 10
Thus, courts affecting thirty-one state jurisdictions have accepted a
97 For example, Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md. 471, 252 A. 2d 855
(1969).
98McCleod v. W. S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965); Piercefield v. Reming-
ton Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W. 2d 129 (1965); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel
Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E. 2d 185 (1966); Marathon Battery Co. v.
Kilpatrick, 418 P. 2d 900 (Okla. 1965).
99"This rule (referring to sec. 402A), of course, places a much heavier burden of
proof upon the purchaser than does the rule which allows recovery by the purchaser
from his immediate seller under T.C.A. sections 47-2-314 and 47-2-315 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code." Leach v. Wiles, 58 Tenn. App. 286, 429 S.W. 2d 823 at 295
(1968), 429 S.W. 2d at 832. The court is referring to the additional required proof
that the defective product was unreasonably dangerous to the user or his property.
100 Clary v. Fifth Avenue Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P. 2d 244 (Alaska, 1969); 0. S.
Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P. 2d 248 (1968); Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P. 2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962);
Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A. 2d 189 (1965); Suvada v. White Motor
Co., 32 111. 2d 612, 210 N.E. 2d 182 (1965); Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co. v. Ford
Motor Co., 174 N.W. 2d 672 (Iowa, 1970); Dealers Transportation Co. v. Battery
Distribution Co., 402 S.W. 2d 441 (Ky. 1965); Meche v. Farmers Drier & Storage
Co., 193 So. 2d 807 (La. Ct. App. 1967); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn.
322, 154 N.W. 2d 488 (1967); State Stove Manufacturing Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d
113 (Miss. 1966); Keener v. Dayton Electric Mfg. Co., 445 S.W. 2d 362 (Mo. 1969);
Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 411 S.W. 2d 443 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966); Buttrick v.
Arthur Lessard and Sons, Inc., 110 N.H. 36, 260 A. 2d 111 (1969); Shoshone
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Bolinski, 82 Nev. 439, 420 P. 2d 855 (1966); Santor v.
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A. 2d 305 (1965); Goldberg v. Kolisman
Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y. 2d 432, 191 N.E. 2d 81, 240 N.Y.S. 2d 592 (1963);
Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P. 2d 806 (1967); Webb v. Zern, 422
Pa. 424, 220 A. 2d 853 (1966); Olney v. Beamon Bottling Co., 220 Tenn. 459, 418
S.W. 2d 430 (1967); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W. 2d 787 (Tex. 1967);
Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P. 2d 729 (1969); imposing strict
liability on manufacturers but not wholesalers or retailers; Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.
2d 443, 155 N.W. 2d 55 (1967).
101 Wasik v. Borg, 423 F. 2d 44 (2nd Cir. 1970), applying Vermont law; Sterling
Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F. 2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969), applying South Dakota law;
Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F. 2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968), applying Montana
law; Schenfeld v. Norton Co., 291 F. 2d 420 (10th Cir. 1968), applying Colorado
law; Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Klimas
v. International Telephone and Telegraph Corp., 297 F. Supp. 937 (D. R.I. 1969);
Newton v. Admiral Corp., 280 F. Supp. 202 (D. Colo. 1967); Yarrow v. Sterling
Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159 (D.S. D. 1967).
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concept of strict liability. It is reasonable to conclude that further
acceptance will ensue.
With such widespread acceptance manufacturers must be concerned
with the interpretation and application of the elements establishing strict
liability. A review of court decisions throughout the United States since
the Lonzrick1 0 2 decision follows to examine the intepretative trends.
Who May Be a Defendant?
One of the principal justifications asserted for the adoption of strict
liability was to place the burdens resulting from the use of defective
products on the manufacturers and other sellers of goods where they
could be more readily absorbed. This policy permits any loss to be
distributed throughout the economy through the seller's prices. It is well
established that direct actions can be brought against manufacturers on
either theory of tort liability, negligence or strict liability.10 3 In contrast
to negligence, strict liability has been generally imposed only on those
who are engaged in the business of supplying goods of a particular
kind. This is consistent with the rationale of section 402A.104
Of interest to the manufacturer is the availability of strict liability
against distributors and retailers. If it is not available as to these members
of the chain of distribution, the manufacturer would be the only one
against whom strict liability could be pressed. Section 402A encompasses
all sellers engaged in the business of selling a particular product and
courts who have determined the issue have included these intermediaries
as proper defendants. 10 Where a retailer solicits orders which are shipped
directly from the manufacturer to the purchaser, it may be difficult to
prove negligence on the part of the retailer. If the product were in fact
102 Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E. 2d 185 (1966).
103 American Motors Corp. v. Mosier, 414 F. 2d 34 (5th Cir. 1969); Speed Fastners,
Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F. 2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967); Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296
F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Hacker v. Rector, 250 F. Supp. 300 (W.D. Mo.1966); Biondo v. General Motors Corp., 5 Ariz. App. 286, 425 P. 2d 856 (1967);
Bengford v. Carlem Corp., 156 N.W. 2d 855 (Iowa 1968); Meche v. Farmers Drier& Storage Co., 193 So. 2d 807 (La. Ct. App. 1967); McCormack v. Hankscraft, 278
Minn. 322, 154 N.W. 2d 488 (1967); Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 102 N.J. Super.279, 246 A. 2d 11 (1968), affirmed 54 N.J. 585, 258 A. 2d 697 (1969); Pimm v.Graybar Electric Co., 278 N.Y.S. 2d 913 (1967): Forry v. Gulf Oil Corp., 428 Pa.334, 237 A. 2d 593 (1968); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W. 2d 55 (1967).
104 Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), § 402A, Comment f.
105 McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co. of Texas, 391 F. 2d 364 (5th Cir. 1968); Haragan
v. Union Oil Co., 312 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Alaska 1970); Bailey v. Montgomery Ward& Co., 6 Ariz. App. 213, 431 P. 2d 108 (1967); Read v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 264Cal. App. 2d 404, 70 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1968); Guglielmo v. Klausner Supply Co., 158Conn. 308, 259 A. 2d 608 (1969); Sweeney v. Matthews, 94 Il1. App. 2d 6, 236 N.E.2d 439 (1968); Keener v. Dayton Electric Manufacturing Co., 445 S.W. 2d 362 (Mo.1969); Pimm v. Graybar Electric Co., 278 N.Y.S. 2d 913 (App. Div. 1967);
McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W. 2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
Spring 1971
30
Akron Law Review, Vol. 4 [1972], Iss. 2, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol4/iss2/7
PRODUCT LIABILITY
defective, however, the retailer could be reached under the strict liability
doctrine. Such a result, coupled with the fact that generally the wholesaler
and retailer are often mere conduits of packaged products without any
ability to control their condition, has prompted severe criticism of the
policy imposing strict liability on these intermediaries. 1' 6 An Oregon court
was prompted to comment, "If both privity and fault are irrelevant, the
wholesaler would be liable, not for a duty he failed to perform, nor for
the breach of a contract he never made, but because he happens to lie
in the stream of commerce."' 0 7 Some states have yet to rule directly
on this issue.
If the seller is a brand name distributor, however, such as Montgom-
ery Ward or Sears Roebuck and Company, the courts hold, and probably
should hold, the seller to the same legal accountability as a manufacturer.
The manufacturer may incur liability not only by placing his finished
goods in the stream of commerce but also by supplying component parts
to other manufacturers of finished goods or by purchasing component
parts for his own product. Early limitations on the strict liability of
component part manufacturers are disappearing. In the leading New York
case of Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corporation,08 the court in
limiting the plaintiff, a passenger in an airliner, to recourse against
the manufacturer of the finished product commented that access to the
finished good manufacturer under strict liability concepts provided
sufficient remedy to the injured passenger. In a subsequent case, a federal
court applying New York law was careful not to open the component
part manufacturer generally to suit but suggested that where the manu-
facturer of the finished product was not susceptable to suit the component
part manufacturer could be reached.'09 In that case the primary defendant
was the United States government which was immune from suit.
Other jurisdictions, however, are setting the pattern of holding the
component part supplier accessible. The leading case casting strict liability
on a component part manufacturer is Suvada v. White Motor Company.
n0
At least Oklahoma, Connecticut, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Minnesota,
106 See the dissent in Bailey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 6 Ariz. App. 213, 431 P. 2d
108 (1967); Washington limited the strict liability doctrine to manufacturers, Ulmer
v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P. 2d 729 (1969); in Lonzrick v. Republic
Steel Corp., Ohio imposed implied warranty in tort liability on a manufacturer-seller.
107 Price v. Gatlin, 241 Or. 315 at 316, 405 P. 2d 502 at 503 (1965).
108 12 N.Y. 2d 432, 191 N.E. 2d 81, 240 N.Y.S. 2d 592 (1963).
1o9 Sevits v. McKiernan-Terry Corporation, 264 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. 1966). The New
York Supreme Court later affirmed the insulation of the component part manu-
facturer in Millard v. Binkley, 280 N.Y.S. 2d 21 (App. Div. 1967).
n0 32 IM. 2d 612, 210 N.E. 2d 182 (1965).
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and Michigan agree."' Indeed, Connecticut apparently would extend strict
liability to the manufacturers of sub-component parts. 112 Of course, the
plaintiff must allege and prove that the component part was expected to
and did reach the injured party without substantial change in its
condition as sold.
A significant recent expansion in the class of eligible defendants
affects manufacturers in their testing and promotional activities. Section
402A imposes liability on "sellers" of products, and, indeed, this has been
the focus of the courts. The Supreme Court of Texas, in its decision
adopting section 402A,113 held that one who delivers an advertising
sample to another with the expectation of profiting therefrom through
future sales is in the same position as one who sells a product. In this
case, samples were supplied to a beauty parlor and the owner suffered
personal injury when an employee gave her a permanent. More recently,
an Indiana court suggested redefining the category of persons on whom
strict liability should be imposed. 114 A paint company supplied unsatis-
factory paint to its customers and to remedy the situation furnished a
paint remover to them free of charge. The plaintiff's decedent was fatally
injured when the remover caught fire and suit was initiated under the
strict liability doctrine. The problem facing the court was that the product
had not been sold. The court may have fictionalized that the remover was
"sold" as part of the original sale of the paint but instead elected to define
as a proper defendant one who places a product in "the stream of
commerce." Manufacturers of such products as drugs or cosmetics where
promotional or test samples are employed in marketing their goods would
be reachable without the presence of a sale under the "stream of
commerce" rationale. At this point, it should be noted that strict
liability has been imposed on other than sellers, e.g., lessors," 5 builders, 1 6
licensors," 7 and suppliers of services." 8
11 Rossignol v. Danbury School of Aeronautics, Inc., 154 Conn. 459, 227 A. 2d 418(1967); Penn v. Inferno Manufacturing Corp., 199 So. 2d 210 (La. Ct. App. 1967);
Savage v. Peterson Distributing Co., 379 Mich. 197, 150 N.W. 2d 804 (1967); Hill v.
Wilmington Chemical Corp., 279 Minn. 336, 156 N.W. 2d 898 (1968); Barnhart
v. Freeman Equipment Co., 441 P. 2d 993 (Okla. 1968); Burbage v. Boiler Engineer-
ing & Supply Co., 433 Pa. 319, 249 A. 2d 563 (1969).
112 Rossignol v. Danbury School of Aeronautics, Inc., 154 Conn. 549, 227 A. 2d 418
(1967).
113 McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W. 2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
114 Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 258 N.E. 2d 681 (Ind. App. 1970).
115 Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P. 2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970);
McClaflin v. Bayshore Equipment Rental Co., 274 Cal. 2d 446, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337
(1969); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A. 2d 769
(1965).
116 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A. 2d 314 (1965).
"7 Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970).
ll8 Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A. 2d 697 (1969).
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How long may the manufacturer be exposed to strict liability after
the original sale of his product? The answer, where the product was
defective when it left the manufacturer's control, is as long as a defective
product exists and its defective condition is the cause of the loss. This
posture of the law is especially crucial where the alleged defect is in the
design of the product. It requires a manufacturer who discovers a latent
defect in the goods after their sale to take steps to correct or warn of the
deficiency. Roseneau v. City of New Brunswick"9 illustrates the extended
period of exposure a manufacturer may endure. Water meters were
defectively manufactured and sold to the city in 1942. The meters
were installed in 1950 and the injury to the property of the plaintiff
occurred in 1964. The court ruled that the statute of limitations
commenced when the damage occurred and a suit filed within the
statutory period after the injury was timely brought. Furthermore,
the original sale of the product to the consuming public does not terminate
the manufacturer's liability. The manufacturer of an automobile sold
as a used car has been held amenable to suit. 20 The automobile was
manufactured in 1959, purchased as a used car in 1961 and the collision
occurred, allegedly due to a design defect, in 1963.
The manufacturer must also anticipate that whenever a seller
downstream in the distributive chain is pursued on the theory of strict
liability, he may be impleaded as a defendant.l2
What Products?
In the promulgation of section 402A it was initially suggested that
the doctrine should be limited to the sale of food. 122 Extension was then
recommended to include products for "intimately bodily use.' 123 As it was
finalized the section was intended to apply to any product. The courts
have given effect to this intention. The Nevada Supreme Court recently
announced, "We now extend that doctrine (strict liability) to the design
and manufacture of all types of products."'1 4 The plaintiff must establish
that his injury was caused by a defect in the product, that such defect
existed when the product left the hands of the manufacturer, and that the
product in its defective condition was "unreasonably dangerous to the user
119 51 N.J. 130, 238 A. 2d 169 (1968). See also, Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Ford
Motor Co., 174 N.W. 2d 672 (Iowa 1970), where strict liability recovery was allowed
for a defective brake drum on a truck that was 21 months old and had been driven
30,000 miles.
120 McNally v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 284 N.Y.S. 2d 761 (1967).
121McDevitt v. Standard Oil Company of Texas, 391 F. 2d 364 (5th Cir. 1968);
Tromza v. Tecumseh Products Co., 378 F. 2d 601 (3rd Cir. 1967); LaGorga v.
Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Midwest
Dairy Product Corp., 211 So. 2d 675 (La. Ct. App. 1968).
122 38 A.L.I. Proceedings 56 (1961).
123 39 A.L.I. Proceedings 244 (1962).
14 Ginnes v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 470 P. 2d 135 (Nev. 1970).
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or consumer." A review of the cases arising in the past five years on which
this article is based reveals that the automobile and truck manufacturers
are by far the most frequently pursued. Other frequent defendants are
the producers of power machinery and tools, the tire manufacturers, the
manufacturers of chemical products such as cleaners and fertilizers, and
the manufacturers of drugs, cosmetics, food and beverages. The appear-
ance as defendants of manufacturers of products with rather high coeffi-
cients of safety illustrate the applicability of strict liability to any product.
Producers of shoes,12u shower mats, 126 baking dishes,121 tarpaulins,'128 vacu-
um cleaners, 129 and catchers' masks' 30 have defended strict liability suits.
What Is a Defective Condition?
Proof of the elements associated with the concept of a defective
product is the focal point for the establishment of strict liability. The
injured party must allege and prove the existence of a defect that is
unreasonably dangerous, that the defect existed when it was delivered
by the seller,u1 and that the defect was the proximate cause of injury.
This concept implies that products may be defective but not unreasonably
dangerous and strict liability would not apply. Further, it suggests
that latent defects are of concern since a patent defect in manufacturing
would preclude the product from being unreasonably dangerous. This
evaluation is substantiated by the cases allowing recovery on a theory
of strict liability.-32
The observation has been made that the elements of a defective
product under the strict liability doctrine do not differ materially from
the elements that must exist in an action based on negligence.133 This
practical evaluation is essentially valid since the establishment of the
'm Bennett v. International Shoe Co., 275 Cal. App. 2d 729, 80 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1969).
1w Wagner v. Coronet Hotel, 10 Ari. App. 296, 458 P. 2d 390 (1969).
IV Kerr v. Coming Glass Works, 284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W. 2d 587 (1969).
Us San Antonio Tent & Awning Co. v. Martin, 437 S.W. 2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
129 Post v. American Cleaning Equipment Corp., 437 S.W. 2d 516 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
130 Roseboro v. Rawlings Manufacturing Co., 275 Cal. 2d 43, 79 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1969).
131 Jacobsen v. Ford Motor Co., 199 Kan. 64, 437 P. 2d 621 (1967); Jack Roach-
Bissonnet, Inc. v. Puskar, 417 S.W. 2d (Tex. 1967).
1
32 Clary v. Fifth Avenue Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P. 2d 244 (Alaska 1969), leak in
an automobile exhaust system; Gates & Sons, Inc. v. Brock, 199 So. 2d 291 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1967), broken snap tie on a scaffold; Sweeney v. Matthews, 94 Ill. App. 2d 6,236 N.E. 2d 439 (1968), low carbon content in a nail; Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell
Manufacturing Co., 86 Ill. App. 2d 315, 229 N.E. 2d 684 (1967), metal failure in ahand tool; Ford Motor Co. v. Cockrell, 211 So. 2d 833 (Miss. 1968), short circuitin a starter; Rooney v. S. A. Healy Co., 20 N.Y. 2d 42, 228 N.E. 2d 383 (1967),defective plunger in a gas mask; Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W. 2d 630 (Tex.1969), defective pushrod in a brake system; Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d
522, 452 P. 2d 729 (1969), loose bolt in automobile A-frame causing loss of control.
'3m See "Strict Liability to the Consumer in California," William L. Prosser, appearing
in Products Liability, New Developments, Practicing Law Institute (1970).
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elements of a defective product under strict liability would permit
invoking res ipsa loquitur to take a negligence issue to the jury. However,
as will be developed later, there is a theoretical difference in the two
theories that have caused courts in a given case to allow the case to go to
the jury on the basis of strict liability but not on the theory of negligence.
This difference is that in a negligence action the plaintiff must trace the
defect to a negligent act of the defendant whereas under strict liability
the plaintiff must show only the defective condition.13 4 What conduct
of the defendant produced the defect is not a strict liability issue.
There are two significant evidentiary rules appearing regarding proof
of the defective condition. First, the courts are permitting the issue of a
defective condition to go to the jury where the only evidence of a defect
is inferential and not direct.135 Second, the cases reveal a tendency by the
courts to accept the premise that the injured party need not prove any
particular defect but only that the product was defective in the sense that
it was not fit for its intended use.' 36 Thus, when the power steering fails
on an automobile the plaintiff need not show what was defective but
that the automobile itself was not fit for its intended use.
This view raises the issue of what a consumer should reasonably
expect with reference to the intended use of the product. In the Oregon
case adopting strict liability, 3 7 the evidence indicated that before the
wheel of a truck failed the wheel struck a five-inch rock. The court
asserted that the question for the jury was what consumers reasonably
may expect from a product not what they should expect. Evidence of this
nature was not produced. To be unreasonably dangerous the product must
be dangerous beyond the degree ordinarily contemplated by the consumer.
The court accepted the argument that a defect can be shown by proof
that the product did not perform in keeping with the reasonable
expectations of the user rather than requiring proof of a specific defect.
A manufacturer's liability will not necessarily be preempted by the
fact that the product was in use for a substantial period of time. Decisions
favorable to plaintiffs have been received where an automobile was
driven eight months and three thousand miles before accident, 38 a
134 Greco v. Bucciconi Engineering Co., 283 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Pa. 1967), affirmed
407 F. 2d 87 (3rd Cir. 1969).
135 Smith v. Hencir-Nichols, Inc., 276 Minn. 390, 150 N.W. 2d 556 (1967).
136Clary v. Fifth Avenue Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P. 2d 244 (Alaska 1969);
Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 411 S.W. 2d 443 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966); Vanek v. Kirby,
253 Or. 494, 450 P. 2d 778 (1969); Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435
P. 2d 806 (1967).
137 Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P. 2d 806 (1967).
138 American Motors Corp. v. Mosier, 414 F. 2d 34 (5th Cir. 1969).
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truck was in use for four months and over five thousand miles,L" and
a hammer was in use for eleven months before it chipped. 140
If the product is defective and proximately causes the injury the fact
that the injured person acted negligently, unless his negligent conduct
is in the nature of assumption of risk, will not preclude liability. Where
the injured person is unaware of the defect and is negligent in the use
of the product, the careless conduct is not available as a defense. For
example, liability cannot be avoided where the plaintiff drives a defective
automobile at an excess speed, while intoxicated, or in some other
careless manner and is injured as a result of the defect.
The manufacturer's primary concern must be with the design of his
product. When a design is defective it is incorporated in all the products
produced. Furthermore, the injured party has better evidence available to
him to prove the defect and the fact that the product was used safely for
an extended period of time by others is of little help to the defendant.'41
The establishment of defective design in strict liability cases is similar
to the process developed in the negligence cases. The plaintiff must allege
and prove a duty to design in a certain manner, a failure of that duty, and
an injury proximately caused by that failure. In a strict liability case, a
defect in design makes the manufacturer's conduct an issue, while a defect
arising in the production of the article does not.
In the past, the courts were reluctant to impose design liability.
Special competency, judgment and knowledge are involved in the design
of products and courts were hesitant to substitute their standards for those
possessing this competency. In recent years this reluctancy has retreated.
The courts now firmly assert that defects include design defects.'4
The basic duty of the manufacturer is to design the product so
that it is not unreasonably dangerous when employed in its normal
foreseeable use. 43 The salient elements are "unreasonably dangerous"
and "foreseeable use." As to the latter, it has been held that use without
mishap over a long period of time does not necessarily negate the finding
139 Ford Motor Co. v. Cockrell, 211 So. 2d 833 (Miss. 1968).
140 Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E. 2d 401 (1969).
141 Rooney v. S. A. Healy Co., 20 N.Y. 2d 42, 228 N.E. 2d 383 (1967).
142 Vandercook & Son, Inc. v. Thorpe, 395 F. 2d 104 (5th Cir. 1968); Dazenko v.
James Hunter Machine Co., 393 F. 2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); LaGorga v. Kroger Co.,
275 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967); Clary v. Fifth Avenue Chrysler Center, Inc., 454
P. 2d 244 (Alaska 1969); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 85 Cal Rptr.
629 (1970); Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d 334, 236 N.E. 2d 125(1968), reversed on other grounds, 45 II. 2d 418, 261 N.E. 2d 305 (1970).
143Royal v. Black and Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1967); Bartkewich
v. Billinger, 432 Pa. 351, 247 A. 2d 603 (1968); Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202,
166 S.E. 2d 173 (1969).
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of foreseeability of a particular use that may be dangerous.", Thus, a
piece of machinery without adequate safety devices may be carefully
used for a long period before an injury occurs but this safe use would
not preclude a finding of unreasonably dangerous design for a foreseeable
use. Not only must the manufacturer be concerned with the use of his
product and its design, but in designing he must also anticipate hazards
associated with its maintenance or care. 45
A major expansion in the design responsibility of manufacturers
has recently occurred. This increase in design responsibility has been
associated primarily with the automobile industry but the principles
established encompass all other products.
A suit alleging negligent and defective design was decided against
General Motors Corporation in 1966 which produced a definition of the
standard of care a manufacturer owed in the design of an automobile.'"
The automobile in which the decedent was riding had what was described
as an "X frame" which, it was alleged, did not provide adequate
protection to the occupants of the car as did the more conventional
perimeter frames. As a result, in a collision in which the decedent's
car was struck broadside, fatal injuries were incurred. The personal
representative of the decedent asserted that the event causing the
death was a foreseeable event and the design created an unreasonable
risk to the occupants. The District Court dismissed the complaint as
not stating a cause of action. The Circuit Court of Appeals to decide
the case had to define the design duty owed to users by the manufacturer.
The court held that a manufacturer is not under a duty to make his
product accident proof nor must he make his product "more safe" where
the danger to be avoided is obvious.147 His duty is to make the product
reasonably safe for its intended use. It was further emphasized that
the intended purpose of an automobile does not include its participation
in collisions with other objects, despite the manufacturer's ability to
foresee the possibility that such collisions may occur.
The rationale of the above care was followed by a federal district
court in Shumard v. General Motors Corporation.148 An automobile
burst into flame following a collision causing fatal injuries to the plaintiff's
'4Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 IIM. App. 334, 236 N.E. 2d 125 (1968), reversed
and remanded on basis that assumption of risk issue should have gone to jury, 45
Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E. 2d 305 (1970).
145 Richey v. Sumoge, 273 F. Supp. 904 (D. Or. 1967), where strict liability issue was
given to the jury and the plaintiff recovered. The court asserted that the need to
remove debris from parts of the machine while it was running was foreseeable.
146 Evans v. General Motors Corporation, 359 F. 2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).
147 To the same effect, Royal v. Black and Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So. 2d 307 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1967), where it was alleged that an electric plug could have been designed
"more safely."
148270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
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decedent. The plaintiff, emphasizing the foreseeability factor, charged
that the manufacturer had the duty to design its automobile to be
fireproof when involved in collisions with other objects. The court
described the responsibilities of the manufacturer as the duty to design
the car to be reasonably fit for its intended purpose, its normal and
proper use, and not for an unintended use.
The principles expounded by those cases were shortlived. Approxi-
mately one year later, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its
precedent breaking decision in Larsen v. General Motors Corporation.149
The plaintiff alleged that the design of the steering column assembly
constituted an increased hazard to the occupant of the automobile when
it was involved in an accident. The alleged defective design did not cause
the collision. The accident was a head-on collision. The District Court
granted summary judgment for the defendant. The Circuit Court asserted
that the manufacturer's duty is to design a product that is reasonably fit
for its intended use and free of hidden defects that could render it
unsafe for such use. It then turned its attention to the "intended use" of
the automobile. The court ruled that it is foreseeable that an automobile
will be involved in some type of injury-producing accident and the
manufacturer cannot say that such use is not intended. When the manu-
facturer's design causes an unreasonable risk to the users of its products,
liability should follow. Such injuries, according to the court, are readily
foreseeable as an incident of the normal and intended use of the auto-
mobile. The duty of reasonable care must be viewed in light of the risks
involved. The court continued, "While all risks cannot be eliminated nor
can a crash-proof vehicle be designed under the present state of the art,
there are many common sense factors in design, which are or should be
well known to the manufacturer that will minimize or lessen the injurious
effects of a collision."15 0 The decision made it clear that this duty applies
to all manufacturers with the customary limitations of intended or
unforeseeable use. The court, while emphasizing that its holdings were
relevant to the issue of negligence, indicated it anticipated no obstacle to
employing these principles when the claim was based on strict liability.
The Larsen case represents a major change in the law concerning the
design liability of manufacturers and has been accepted by other courts.' 5'
The obviousness of the design peril will not necessarily preclude
149 391 F. 2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
150 Id. at 503.
151 Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Grundmanis
v. British Motors Corp., 308 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis. 1970); DeFelice v. Ford Motor
Co., 28 Conn. Sup. 164, 255 A. 2d 636 (1969); Storey v. Exhaust Specialties & Parts,
Inc., 464 P. 2d 831 (Or. 1970); Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E. 2d
173 (1969).
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design liability. In Pike v. Frank G. Hough Company,152 the defendant
contended that the danger of being struck by a paydozer was a patent
peril and therefore it had no duty to install safety devices to protect
against an obvious danger. The California court disagreed stating that
the peril was not obvious to bystanders and the obviousness of the
defect is a matter of defense for jury consideration generally.
Although the design of the product must not present an unusual
risk of harm, its design need not insure that an injury could not occur
under any condition.5
Turning to the duty of the manufacturer to warn, the law requires
that the manufacturer must warn of any latent dangerous conditions. This
includes conditions resulting from defective design. Where the danger is
obvious and known to the user, no warning is required. 54 Also, the duty
to warn arises only when the product presents a danger in the course of
intended use. It is understandable that the failure to exercise care to
discover defects and warn as to their existence should give rise to
actionable negligence when an injury occurs. However, to the extent that
"failure to warn" is viewed as a defect under the concept of strict liability,
the manufacturer could experience liability in those cases where he made
all reasonable efforts to discover any defects but such defects were not
discoverable within the current state of the art. Many cases in strict
liability jurisdictions involving failure to warn are brought on a
negligence theory. 5 5 This reflects the uncertainty as to whether or not
"failure to warn" is a defect under the rationale of section 402A.
Cases do appear treating "failure to warn" as a defect. A California
appeals court, reversing a lower court's judgment for the defendant
notwithstanding the jury's verdict for plaintiff, suggested that "failure to
warn" could be a defect under the theory of strict liability. 156 An Illinois
appellate court, affirming judgment for the plaintiff on the theory of strict
liability, specifically asserted that "defective product" encompasses a
1522 Cal. 3d 465, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970).
153 Schneider v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 401 F. 2d 549 (8th Cir. 1968), where an
automobile window vent was open and, in a dark garage, the plaintiff was cut by
the protrusion.
154 Tomicich v. Western-Knapp Engineering Co., 423 F. 2d 410 (9th Cir. 1970).
'55 DuPree v. Nutone, Inc., 422 F. 2d 534 (6th Cir. 1970); Borowicz v. Chicago
Mastic Co., 367 F. 2d 751 (7th Cir. 1966); Croteau v. Borden Co., 277 F. Supp. 945
(E.D. Pa. 1968); Parris v. M. A. Bruder & Sons, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 406 (E. D. Pa.
1966); Witt v. Chrysler Corp., 15 Mich. App. 576, 167 N.W. 2d 100 (1969);
Hill v. Wilmington Chemical Corp., 279 Minn. 336, 156 N.W. 2d 898 (1968);
Westerberg v. School District No. 792, 276 Minn. 1, 148 N.W. 2d 312 (1967); Thomas
v. Arvon Products, Inc., 424 Pa. 365, 227 A. 2d 897 (1967); Muncy v. Magnolia
Chemical Co., 437 S.W. 2d 15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), in this case the court stated
that lack of proof that the product was defective or not fit for the purpose for which
it was sold barred breach of warranty recovery.
'w Casetta v. United States Rubber Co., 260 Cal. App. 2d 792, 67 Cal. Rptr. 645(1968).
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product without suitable warnings for its foreseeable use.157 In litigation
concerning the Sabin polio vaccine, a federal appellate court asserted,
"We regard failure to warn where the circumstances of sale imposed
that duty, as exposing the vendor to strict liability in tort .... ""5 It
can be anticipated that the courts will follow this rationale and give
full effect to the principles set forth in comment j to section 402A.151
In the negligence suits, the duty to warn has been interpreted
generally to require warning as to consequences reasonably to be
anticipated from a "foreseeable use" of the product. 60 There is evidence
that manufacturers may also have to anticipate "foreseeable misuse."' 6'
In Simpson Timber Co. v. Parks,162 a stevedore was injured when he fell
through a package in which doors were packed for shipment. The doors
were stacked in such a way that a well was formed where the glass was to
be installed prior to use. While adjusting the ship's load, the stevedore
stepped on the package in the area of the well and fell through. The in-
structions given by the court permitted recovery if the manufacturer knew
before it delivered its goods to the dock that stevedores made a practice
of walking on packages of cargo. Although the court asserted that the
manufacturer did not have a legal duty to make inquiry as to the working
practices of those who might handle his product, he would be held
accountable when he knew of a "foreseeable misuse" and failed to warn.
The furnishing of instructions to avoid latent dangers may not
satisfy the duty to warn.16a Directions are supplied to assure effective
use of the product whereas warnings are necessary to assure safe use.
Thus, where a manual was provided giving directions as to the operation
of a trenching machine but no warnings were included as to the fore-
seeably dangerous positions an operator could take nor were instructions
given as to where he should stand, the plaintiff was allowed strict
liability recovery for defective design and failure to warn.
Who May Be a Plaintiff?
The comments to section 402A define a user of the product to
include persons who are passively enjoying the product, such as
'57 Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell Manufacturing Co., 86 IlI. App. 2d 315, 229
N.E. 2d 684 (1967).
18 Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F. 2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968) at 127. Cases
cited by the court to the same effect, Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App.
2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963); Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d
44, 46 Cal Rptr. 552 (1965).
159 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, comment j reads, "In order to prevent the
product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give
directions or warning, on the container as to its use."
160 Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 Ill. App. 2d 315, 229 N.E. 2d 684
(1967); Thomas v. Arvon Products, Inc., 424 Pa. 365, 227 A. 2d 897 (1967).
161 Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965).
162388 U.S. 459 (1967), vacating and remanding 369 F. 2d 324 (9th Cir. 1966).
163Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d 334, 236 N.E. 2d 125 (1968);
reversed and remanded on other grounds, 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E. 2d 305 (1970).
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passengers in automobiles or those doing work upon the product as in
the case of an employee of a buyer. At the time the section was drafted
the casual bystander had been denied recovery and the Restatement
assumed a neutral position on further expansion of the class of plaintiffs.
What has occurred in the interim?
Arguments urging limiting the liability to members of the distribution
chain have been unsuccessful. 1' 4 The Uniform Commercial Code extends
its warranties at least to family members, household members and guests
in the home. To the extent that any person who is a beneficiary of the
Code warranties is also a foreseeable user, a strict liability cause of action
would also lie.165 It is well established that users are proper party
plaintiffs.166 Under state wrongful death statutes, surviving spouses may
proceed on the basis of strict liability. 167 The husband of a user was
permitted to recover on the basis of strict liability for injuries incurred by
his wife from the use of hair bleach. The court commented that the
negligence of the wife may have barred recovery on a negligence theory
but this factor was no defense where strict liability was in issue.'68 The
donee of a buyer has been held to be a proper party to pursue the
manufacturer on the basis of strict liability.16 9 Others held to be proper
plaintiffs include the employees of the purchaser, 170 the son of an
164 Royal v. Black and Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So. 2d 307 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967);
Keener v. Dayton Electric Mfg. Co., 445 S.W. 2d 362 (Mo. 1969).
165 American Motors Corp. v. Mosier, 414 F. 2d 34 (5th Cir. 1969), son of purchaser;
McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co. of Texas, 391 F. 2d 364 (5th Cir. 1968), wife and
children of purchaser; McCormack v. Hankscraft, 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W. 2d 488
(1967), daughter of purchaser; Wights v. Staff-Jennings, Inc., 241 Or. 301, 405
P. 2d 624 (1965), wife of purchaser.
166 Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F. 2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967), user of hair
bleach; Casetta v. United States Rubber Co., 260 Cal. App. 2d 792, 67 Cal. Rptr. 645
(1968), tire repairman; Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 258 N.E. 2d 681
(Ind. App. 1970), user of lacquer reducer; Penn v. Inferno Mfg. Corp., 199 So. 2d
210 (La. Ct. App. 1967), user of fluid gauge; Roseneau v. City of New Brunswick, 51
N.J. 130, 238 A. 2d 169 (1968), homeowner whose property was damaged by water
meter; Forry v. Gulf Oil Corp., 428 Pa. 334, 237 A. 2d 593 (1968), service station
owner injured by tire; Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W. 2d 55 (1967),
patron in tavern using product.
167 Royal v. Black and Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So. 2d 307 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Meche
v. Farmers Drier & Storage Co., 193 So. 2d 807 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Keener v.
Dayton Electric Mfg. Co., 445 S.W. 2d 362 (Mo. 1969).
168 McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W. 2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
169 LaGorga v. Kroger Company, 275 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
170Vandercook & Son, Inc. v. Thorpe, 395 F. 2d 104 (5th Cir. 1968); Dazenko
v. James Hunter Machine Co., 393 F. 2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); Speed Fastners, Inc. v.
Newson, 382 F. 2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967); Richy v. Sumoge, 273 F. Supp. 904 (D. Or.
1967); Greco v. Bucciconi Engineering Co., 283 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Pa. 1967),
affirmed 407 F. 2d 87 (3rd Cir. 1969); McCurter v. Norton Co., 263 Cal. App. 2d
402, 69 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1968); Gates & Sons, Inc. v. Brock, 199 So. 2d 291 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1967); Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d 34, 236 N.E. 2d 125
(1968), reversed on other grounds 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E. 2d 305 (1970); Ford
Motor Co. v. Cockrell, 211 So. 2d 833 (Miss. 1968); Pimm v. Graybar Electric Co.,
278 N.Y.S. 2d 913 (1967).
41
Jenkins: Product Liability
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1972
4 AKRON LAW REVIEW (2)
employee of the purchaser,17' the employee of a bailee, 172 the employee
of a lessee' 73 and a lessee 74 of the product as against the lessor on the
basis of strict liability, and the buyer of a used automobile against
the manufacturer.17 5
The acceptance of bystanders as proper plaintiffs has produced the
most significant expansion in this area of the law of product liability.
Some courts have declined to designate the bystander as a proper party.176
These courts do not represent the prevailing trend. Generally, bystanders
have been permitted to bring strict liability suits.17 Under the rationale
of the Restatement a passenger in an automobile is a "passive user" and
can maintain an action. 17 The plaintiff class has been expanded to
include as foreseeable parties the passengers in the car struck by the
defective automobile. 7 9
A dramatic extension of the policy toward bystanders appears in
Mitchell v. Miller, a case previously discussed.8 0 In that case, a golfer
was fatally injured by an automobile that ran away allegedly due to
a defect in the automatic transmission's "park" position. A demurrer
filed by the defendant manufacturer challenging the ability of such a
remote party to bring the suit was overruled.
The criteria of foreseeability is used by the courts to determine who
is a proper party to bring an action. The question is whether or not it
was foreseeable that the particular plaintiff would be affected by the
product. One court observed, "A restriction on the recovery by bystanders
is only the distorted shadow of a vanishing privity. .. ."181 The same
court reasoned,
171 Bengford v. Carlem Corp., 156 N.W. 2d 855 (Iowa 1968).
172 Martinez v. Nichols Conveyor & Engineering Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 795, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 842 (1966).
173 Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P. 2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970).
174 McClaflin v. Bayshore Equipment Rental Company, 274 Cal. App. 446, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 337 (1969). A federal court has held that section 402A does not apply tolessors, Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 275 F. Supp. 861 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
175 McNally v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 284 N.Y.S. 2d 761 (1967).
176 Davidson v. Leadingham, 294 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Ky. 1968).
177Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc., 419 F. 2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1969); Sills v.
Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Caruth v. Mariani, IIAriz. App. 188, 463 P. 2d 83 (1969); Preissman v. Ford Motor Co., I Cal. App. 3d
841, 82 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1969); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133N.W. 2d 129 (1965); Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W. 2d 630 (Tex. 1969).
178 Hacker v. Rector, 250 F. Supp. 300 (W.D. Mo. 1966); Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co.,
75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P. 2d 729 (1969).
179 Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P. 2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr.
652 (1969).
180 26 Conn. Supp. 214, 214 A. 2d 694 (1965), p. 136.
181 Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578 at 583, 451 P. 2d 84 at 89, 75
Cal. Rptr. 652 at 657 (1969), quoting 2 Harper and James, Th' Law of Torts, 1572,
n. 6 (1956).
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If anything, the bystander should be entitled to greater protection
than the consumer or user where injury to bystanders from the
defect is reasonably foreseeable. Consumers and users, at least, have
the opportunity to inspect for defects and to limit their purchases
to articles manufactured by reputable manufacturers and sold by
reputable retailers, whereas the bystander ordinarily has no such
opportunity.8 2
Consistent with this reasoning, rescuers of a person in trouble because of
a defective product have been allowed recourse to the manufacturer.
183
Foreseeability may be a term for which the phrase "public policy"
could be reasonably substituted.
What Damages May Be Recovered?
The Uniform Commercial Code expressly provides for the recovery
of consequential damages by a buyer.184 These damages could be in the
nature of personal injury, property damage or commercial loss.18 Any
disclaimer of liability for personal injuries to consumers is declared by
the Code to be prima facie unconscionable. 186 Foreseeable damages
resulting from the negligence of the seller with reference to his product
are recoverable under the theory of negligence whether the loss be
personal injury, property damage or ascertainable commercial loss.
What factors of damage may be claimed from the manufacturer under
the theory of strict liability?
Section 402A allows the user of consumer to recover for damages to
his person or to his property. The courts consistently permit suits under
the strict liability theory for personal injuries.187 An interesting develop-
ment has appeared in the personal injury cases. Parallel with the extension
of design liability there has been the problem of adducing to what extent
the injury of the plaintiff was attributable to the defectively designed
product. The problem arises whenever an injury results which is aggra-
vated by a defectively designed product. In the Larsen case,188 the defect
182 Id. at 583, 451 P. 2d at 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
183 Guarino v. Marine Safety Appliances Co., 297 N.Y.S. 2d 639 (1969), affirmed 25
N.Y. 2d 460, 255 N.E. 2d 193, 306 N.Y.S. 2d 942 (1970).
184 Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-713 (1).
185 Id. § 2-715 (2).
18Id. § 2-719 (3).
187 Dazenko v. James Hunter Machine Co., 393 F. 2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); McDevitt
v. Standard Oil Company of Texas, 291 F. 2d (5th Cir. 1968); Speed Fastners v.
Newsom, 382 F. 2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967); Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris,
258 N.E. 2d 681 (Ind. Ct. App. 1970); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich.
85, 133 N.W. 2d 129 (1965); McCormack v. Hankscraft, 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W. 2d
488 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Cockrell, 211 So. 2d 833 (Miss. 1968); Keener
v. Dayton Electric Co., 445 S.W. 2d 362 (Mo. 1969); Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248
Or. 467, 435 P. 2d 806 (1967); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W. 2d 787
(Tev. 1967); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W. 2d 55 (1967).
188 Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F. 2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
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was not alleged to be the proximate cause of the accident but a factor
causing greater injuries than should have been sustained. The principle
enunciated was that the defendant was not answerable for all the damages
resulting from the collision but only those injuries over and above what
would have been received without the design defect. The plaintiff must
carry the apportionment burden of proof. A similar problem will have
to be resolved in those jurisdictions subscribing to comparative negligence.
Wisconsin, for example, suggests that strict liability should be viewed
as negligence liability for the purpose of applying the comparative
negligence doctrine. 89
Damage to property is recoverable by a proper plaintiff, 9 0 including
a bystander.191 When section 402A liability is in issue, disclaimers in
the sales contract are ineffective to preclude liability for property
damages 9 2 as well as personal injury.
The aspect of monetary or commercial loss recovery on the basis of
strict liability is still undergoing development. In a recent federal appellate
court decision the court applying Pennsylvania law denied recovery of
commercial losses under strict liability.193 However, a federal district court
applying Tennessee law permitted consideration of the element of com-
mercial loss in a strict liability case. 94 Another district court applying
Colorado law specifically ruled out commercial losses as an item ofdamage under this theory.1 5 It is anticipated that eventually the type
of damage experienced will be immaterial so long as the loss proximately
flows from the defect in the product.
Summary
This section has been devoted to exploring the trends of the past few
years in the interpretation of the law of strict liability. This theory ofliability has been stressed because it currently represents the most dynamic
theory of product liability. The theories of contract warranty and
negligence remain significant and available but neither have experienced
189 Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W. 2d 55 (1967).
190 Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 275 F. Supp. 861 (W.D. Pa. 1967);Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966); Savage
v. Petersen Distributing Co., 379 Mich. 197, 150 N.W. 2d 804 (1967); Roseneau v.City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 238 A. 2d 169 (1968).
19' Arato v. International Harvester Co., 294, N.Y.S. 2d 832 (1968).
192 Arrow Transportation Co. v. Fruehauf, 289 F. Supp. 170 (D. Or. 1968); Seely
v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P. 2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).193 Southwest Forest Industries, Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 422 F. 2d 1013(9th Cir. 1970); to the same effect, Santor v. Karagheusian, 44 N.J. 52, 207 A. 2d305 (1965).
194 Burnett v. Quaker Oats Co., 289 F. Supp. 280 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
19 5 Miekle v. Smith-Brooks Printing Co., 303 F. Supp. 501 (D. Colo. 1969); to thesame effect, Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P. 2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17(1965), containing a strong dissent supporting recovery of commercial losses.
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in the past five years the expansion and change associated with strict
liability. To this point, emphasis has been placed on the tendency to
expand the application of strict liability through interpretation. Sellers
have been defined to include not only the manufacturer of the finished
product but the manufacturer of component and subcomponent parts.
Strict liability has been imposed on brand name distributors, lessors,
licensors, building contractors and suppliers of services. The exposure
time for potential liability is measured from the date of the injury rather
than from the date of the sale. Further, resale of the product does not
preempt the manufacturer's liability.
Strict liability reaches the manufacturers of all products. True, some
products by their nature are more apt to be defective and unreasonably
dangerous but conceptually all products are encompassed and the courts
have not excepted any type or class of product.
The defect may be shown by inferential evidence where direct
evidence cannot be produced. Instead of requiring proof of a specific
defect, proof that the product was not fit for its intended purpose has been
accepted as sufficient evidence of a defect. The design duty of a manu-
facturer has been broadened and his failure to perform this duty may
result in a defective product for the purposes of strict liability.
The manufacturer may now have to design a product "more safe"
for its foreseeable uses and provide warnings of foreseeable "misuses."
The classes of permissible plaintiffs in a strict liability action
has been expanded to include the bystander, going beyond the "passive
user" class described in the comments to section 402A. Surviving
spouses have successfully pursued wrongful death suits where state
statutes allow such actions.
Finally, the elements of recoverable damages are being expanded
to include commercial or monetary losses in addition to personal injuries
and property damage. Although the law on this point is not well defined
at the moment, the direction seems clear.
In view of these developments, the manufacturer might logically
ask what the limits are to this liability. State legislatures have not
defined any limits. The courts, therefore, must answer the question.
What has been the response of the courts? A review of the selected
cases follows exploring this question.
VI. A SEARCH FOR LIMITATIONS
The purpose of this section is to identify limitations on the liability
of manufacturers, primarily strict liability, announced by the courts in
recent years. No attempt is made to evaluate the practical limitations that
may be encountered in the trial phase of a product liability suit.
The principles of negligence law are well established. A manufacturer
pursued on this theory has available such defenses as contributory
negligence, assumption of risk or the intervening negligence of another
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party. In addition, the manufacturer is entitled to expect a normal
use of his product.196
In regard to liability founded on contractual warranty, the Uniform
Commercial Code expressly provides a method to disclaim warranties 97
and to limit consequential damages.1 9s As previously discussed, the
disclaimers in a sales agreement do not operate to disclaim strict
liability.199 Further, if the warranty is one sounding in tort, strict liability,
there is no requirement of due notice. 200 Of special importance are
the provisions of the code prescribing unconscionable disclaimers201 or
limitations of remedies which permit a court to refuse the enforcement
of such provisions. 202
What limitations on recovery are emerging in the case law with
respect to strict liability? The major limitation appearing is the failure
of the plaintiff to make out his case. Proof of the defect and its causal
relation to the injury are the focal points of the burden of proof. Another
major element of the plaintiff's burden is proving the product was
defective when it left the control of the manufacturer.2 03 Failure to
carry the burden of proof constitutes the major limitation on the actual
liability of manufacturers.
The comments to section 402A discuss certain limitations regarding
an injured person's ability to recover.204 Contributory negligence is not a
defense to the liability when such negligence consists mainly in a failure
to discover a defect or to guard against the possibility of its existence. The
recent cases sustain this position. 2 5 The experience of the courts of
196 Odekirk v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 274 F. 2d 441 (7th Cir. 1961); Yecny v. Eclipse
Fuel Engineering Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 192, 26 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1962).
197 Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-316.
198 Id. § 2-719.
199 Supra, at 83.
200 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P. 2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1962); § 2-607 of the Uniform Commercial Code requires notice to the
seller for any breach of warranty.
201 Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-302.
202d. § 2-719 (3) makes limitations on damages for personal injuries, associated
with consumer goods, prima facie unconscionable.
203 Rossignol v. Danbury School of Aeronautics, Inc., 154 Conn. 549, 227 A. 2d 418(1967); plaintiff failed to allege that product reached him without substantial change;
Meche v. Farmers Drier & Storage Co., 193 So. 2d 807 (La. Ct. App. 1967), an
elevator failed eleven years after delivery.
204 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, comment n.
205McDevitt v. Standard Oil Company of Texas, 391 F. 2d 364 (5th Cir. 1968);
Barnes v. Omark Industries, Inc., 369 F. 2d 4 (8th Cir. 1966); 0. S. Stapley Co. v.
Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P. 2d 248 (1968); Earth v. B. F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265
Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968); Preston v. Up-Right, Inc., 243 Cal. App.2d 636, 52 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1966); Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d 334,
236 N.E. 2d 125 (1968), reversed on other grounds 45 II. 2d 418, 261 N.E. 2d 305(1970); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W. 2d 786 (Tex. 1967).
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Illinois illustrates the definitional difficulty encountered with contributory
negligence as a defense to strict liability. In 1967, an appeals court in
Illinois viewed contributory negligence as a proper issue in a strict
liability suit.2 6 This position was followed in 1969 in Taylor v. Carborun-
dum Company.207 In Adams v. Ford Motor Company,208 an appellate
court reversed a judgment of a lower court on the basis that the court
erred in its charge that to bar recovery the plaintiff's negligence must be
the sole cause of the injury not just a contributory cause. Finally, the law
of Illinois became consistent with the position of the Restatement."
The Restatement acknowledges that the form of contributory
negligence which consists of voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to
encounter a known danger, commonly characterized as assumption of
risk, is a defense to strict liability7' 0 The courts have followed this
rule,211 especially where the hazard is obvious. Where the injured party
has been properly warned,212 or has failed to follow proper instructions
the defense of assumption of risk has been viewed as appropriate. The
test used is a subjective one as to the particular plaintiff, that is,
whether the specific plaintiff proceeded unreasonably to use the product
after discovery of any defect.213
Closely related to the assumption of risk rationale is the defense that
the product was misused or used abnormally. Misuse or abnormal use has
been viewed as similar to a defense of contributory negligence but
permissible. 214 In theory, the alleged defect must make the product
unreasonably dangerous for its intended use and hence any misuse or
abnormal use would be at the risk of the user. This principle has been
206 Dunham v. Vaughn and Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 11. App. 2d 315, 229 N.E. 2d
684 (1967).
207 107 Ill. App. 12, 246 N.E. 2d 898 (1969).
208 103 Ill. App. 2d 356, 243 N.E. 2d 843 (1968).
209 See VanDorpe v. Koyker Farm Implement Co., 427 F. 2d 91 (7th Cir. 1970).
210 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, Comment n.
211 VanDorpe v. Koyker Farm Implement Co., 427 F. 2d 91 (7th Cir. 1970); Williams
v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 II. App. 2d 334, 236 N.E. 2d 125 (1968), reversed on other
grounds 45 Il. 2d 418, 261 N.E. 2d 305 (1970); Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
253 Md. 471, 252 A. 2d 855 (1969), a negligence suit but the court indicated
assumption of risk would apply to strict liability; Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co., 423
Pa. 324, 223 A. 2d 746 (1966); Proctor and Gamble Co. v. Langley, 422 S.W. 2d
773 (Tex. 1967).
212 Harris v. Belton, 258 Cal. App. 2d 595, 65 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1968), proper warning
and plaintiff's injury was the result of a particular sensitivity.
213 Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d 334, 236 N.E. 2d 125 (1968),
reversed on other grounds 45 1M. 2d 418, 261 N.E. 2d 305 (1970).
214 McDevitt v. Standard Oil Company of Texas, 391 F. 2d 364 (5th Cir. 1968);
Neusus v. Sponholtz, 369 F. 2d 259 (7th Cir. 1966).
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applied by the courts. 215 Such a defense is particularly relevant where
proper instructions are included with the product and the user fails to
follow them.216 A recent interesting example of the facets of this defense
appeared in Schemel v. General Motors Corporation2 7 wherein the
plaintiff asserted that the defendant was negligent in designing an
automobile that would travel 115 miles per hour. In affirming dismissal
of the suit, the court equated unlawful use with unintended or abnormal
use. Although the suit was brought in negligence the equation should
transfer to strict liability.
A defense available to strict liability closely related to that of
unintended use of misuse is intervening cause. 218 Component part
manufacturers may avail themselves of this defense whenever there has
been a substantial change in their product in its incorporation into a
finished product. The availability of intervening cause as a defense makes
it advisable for the manufacturer to inform his customers of any known
defects or dangers associated with the product whenever they are
discovered. If he communicates this information to his customers and
they fail to warn their customers, especially when the manufacturer is not
in a position to identify and warn the ultimate consumer or user, a
manufacturer may escape liability.219 Although this defense has been
accepted where the manufacturer delegates servicing responsibilities to an
intermediary, Vandermark v. Ford Motor Company220 places substantial
limitations on the ability of a manufacturer to delegate certain responsi-
bilities. In that case, the court refused to allow a manufacturer to
delegate the responsibility for final inspections, connections, and adjust-
215 McDevitt v. Standard Oil Company of Texas, 291 F. 2d 364 (5th Cir. 1968),
excess air placed in tires and driven over rough terrain; Helene Curtis Industries, Inc.
v. Pruitt, 385 F. 2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967), unauthorized mixture of a hair bleach;
Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 275 F. Supp. 861 (W.D. Pa. 1967), abuse
of gasoline filler hose; McCurter v. Norton Company, 263 Cal. App. 2d 441, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 493 (1968), excess rotational speed on an abrasive wheel; Preston v. Up-Right,
Inc., 243 Cal. App. 2d 636, 52 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1966), scaffold being abnormally
used; Hogge v. United States Rubber Co., 192 So. 2d 501 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966),
inflation of a tire disregarding a warning; Bartkewich v. Billinger, 432 Pa. 351, 247
A. 2d 603 (1968), accident could not be expected with normal use of glass
breaking machine.
216 Power Ski of Florida, Inc. v. Allied Chemical Corp., 188 So. 2d 13 (Fla. Ct. App.
1966); Proctor and Gamble Co. v. Langley, 422 S.W. 2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
217 384 F. 2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967).
218 Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F. 2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967), unauthorized
use as intervening cause; Martinez v. Nichols Conveyor & Engineering Co., 243 Cal.
App. 2d 795, 52 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1966), product was modified by employer; West
v. Hydro-Test, Inc., 196 So. 2d 598 (La. Ct. App. 1967), failure to pass along
warnings of manufacturer; Hill v. Wilmington Chemical Corp., 156 N.W. 2d 898(1968), failure to pass along warnings of manufacturer; Proctor & Gamble v. Langley,
422 S.W. 2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), failure to follow instructions.
219 West v. Hydro-Test, Inc., 196 So. 2d 598 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Hill v. Wilmington
Chemical Corp., 279 Minn. 336, 156 N.W. 2d 898 (1968).
22o 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P. 2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
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ments necessary to make the product ready for use, and avoid strict
liability on the basis of intervening cause.
In addition to the above recognized defenses to strict liability,
limitations on the liability of manufacturers could result from the
interpretations placed on "unreasonably dangerous" and "foreseeability"
of the danger or injury.
What is the nature of an unreasonably dangerous product? It has
been defined as a product which a reasonable man would not sell if he
knew of the risks involved with its intended use.221 A Florida court
described a product as unreasonably dangerous when it is fraught with
unexpected dangers.222 On these and similar tests manufacturers have
escaped strict liability on the grounds that the product was not, even
though technically defective, unreasonably dangerous. 22
Similar holdings appear with reference to design responsibility.
Generally, the design of a product must not cause unreasonable risk.224
The design responsibility does not require the creation of a product that is
accident proof2 25 or "more safe" if its present state is reasonably safe. 226
The Larsen case, 227 however, suggests a reevaluation of the manufacturer's
duty to design a product "more safe" with the result that a manufacturer
may be required to design the product "more safe" for a foreseeable use.
An Oregon court expressed the view that strict liability should be
applied consistently with tort law principles in regard to other conduct
and, if it were, strict liability without fault would be invocable only when
the product created an ultrahazardous condition. 228 This position has not
been accepted. However, the concept of "unreasonably dangerous" does
221Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F. 2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967).
222 Royal v. Black and Decker Manufacturing Co., 205 So. 2d 307 (Fla. Ct. App.
1967).
22 Mountain v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 312 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Wis. 1970), shampoo
not unreasonably dangerous where injury a result of allergy; Maas v. Dreher, 10
Ariz. App. 520, 460 P. 2d 191 (1969), sharp corner of plastic container not unreason-
ably dangerous; Royal v. Black and Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So. 2d 307 (Fla. Ct. App.
1967), design of power tool plug not unreasonably dangerous; Fanning v. LeMay, 38
Ill. 2d 209, 230 N.E. 2d 182 (1967), slippery soles of new shoes not unreasonably
dangerous.
224 Schneider v. Chrysler Motors Corporation, 266 F. Supp. 115 (D. Neb. 1967).
225 Royal v. Black and Decker Co., 205 So. 2d 307 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967).
226 Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F. 2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967), ability of an
automobile to travel at 115 m.p.h. does not make it unreasonably safe, strong dissent;
Willis v. Chrysler Corp., 264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967), design of automobile
resulted in it breaking in two in a head-on collision, not unreasonably designed; Royal
v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So. 2d 307 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967), electric plug not
unreasonably designed simply because it could have been made "more safe"; McNally
v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 284 N.Y.S. 2d 761 (1967), ability to design a brake system
"more safe" by installing a failure warning light does not render product unreasonably
dangerous.
227 Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F. 2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
228 Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Or. 301, 405 P. 2d 624 (1965).
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provide a criteria capable of limiting the liability of producers. Current
cases do not reveal a disposition in this direction.
Another possible interpretive limitation is the factor of foreseeability.
Foreseeability is an operable consideration in determining whether or not
the product is unreasonably dangerous for its intended use, whether or
not there was a duty to warn, whether or not the plaintiff was a party who
might be foreseeably injured by the product, and whether or not the par-
ticular damage was a foreseeable consequence of the defect in the product.
The manufacturer may avoid strict liability if he can show that the
product, even though defective, was not being used in a foreseeable
way. Recent cases relate that the manufacturer has no duty to warn of
a hazard resulting from a nonforeseeable misuse of the product nor
can he be held liable when the use itself is unforeseeable. 229 A product
is not necessarily unreasonably dangerous when it produces an allergic
reaction nor is the manufacturer chargable with a duty to warn of
possible allergic reaction. 230
However, the producer must exercise his wit to anticipate what
consumers do reasonably expect from his product.231
The marketing scheme of the manufacturer may be a factor in
establishing his liability. A cosmetic producer was absolved of liability for
injuries resulting from the use of a hair bleach when the product was
intended to be supplied to professional cosmetologists for their use in
preparing an end mixture. The injury resulted from an unauthorized
mixture prepared by a nonprofessional cosmetologist. The court empha-
sized the fact that the nonprofessional was not a person who could
reasonably be expected to use the product.232 The marketing methods of
the producer were cited as a factor bearing on the issue of foreseeability.
Other limitations appear in some jurisdictions which run against
the current thrust of the law of product liability. New York insulated the
229 Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F. 2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967), use of the
product by a non-professional person not foreseeable when the product was made
especially for the professional cosmetologist; Littlehale v. E. I. duPont deNemours &
Co., 380 F. 2d 274 (2nd Cir. 1967), a negligence suit holding that the defendant
could not foresee its detonators manufactured for highly trained ordinance personnel
would be used by a civilian employee of the Navy in a manner not intended; Preston
v. Up-Right, Inc., 243 Cal. App. 2d 636, 52 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1966), pyramiding of
ladder on top a scaffold not a foreseeable use of the scaffold; Westerberg v. School
District No. 792, 276 Minn. 1, 148 N.W. 2d 312 (1967), a water extractor was used
after its safety feature had failed. The court held there was no duty to warn of a use
that could not be foreseen. This was a negligence suit but the principles should
transfer to strict liability.23 0 Mountain v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 312 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
231 Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P. 2d 806 (1967), the test for foresee-
ability purposes is what the customer expects from the product, not what they
should expect.
232 Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F. 2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967).
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component part manufacturer in the Kollsman case.133 A federal court
construed Pennsylvania law as placing strict liability on sellers but not
lessors.234 A California court suggested that it would not allow recovery
of commercial losses on the theory of strict liability.n 5 These decisions
do not reflect the present trends in product liability law.
Summary
As will appear later, the most effective limitation on a manufacturer's
liability is the practical aspects of a plaintiff proving his case, especially
the elements of a defective product and proximate cause.
It is apparent that few significant limitations are emerging in the
legal theories of product liability. This is consistent with the current
concern for the consumer. The most hopeful development for the
manufacturer is the construction the courts may give to "unreasonably
dangerous" and "foreseeable." The economic impact of the current trends
and matters of public policy may encourage the courts to be more
conservative in the future in the interpretation of these concepts.
Presently, however, the tendency is to broaden their meaning.
VII. THE OPERATIVE EFFECTS OF STRICT LIABILITY
An exploration has been made of the recent interpretative develop-
ments in the law of strict product liability. The conclusion was reached
that the courts are continuing to increase direct legal access to manu-
facturers through the interpretation of the elements of strict liability.
Attention will now be shifted to the operative effects of strict liability. In
making this analysis, no distinction was made between those jurisdictions
which expressly subscribed to strict liability as conceived by section 402A
of the Restatement and those which, as Ohio, characterize strict liability
as a warranty action in tort. Both approaches impose a tort liability
without fault and in this respect, are distinguishable from negligence. The
cases for this analysis were selected from the 1969 and 1970 Cumulative
Supplements to Hursh's American Law of Product Liability.236 Cases that
did not involve a manufacturer or were concerned with peripheral issues
were eliminated. For example, a decision by a federal court to the effect
that maritime law permits product liability recovery was deleted since
the case does not focus on the substantive aspects of strict liability.n 7 The
remaining cases were classified according to whether or not the
233 Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y. 2d 432, 191 N.E. 2d 81, 240
N.Y.S. 2d 592 (1963).
234 Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 275 F. Supp. 861 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
235 Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P. 2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965),
strong dissent on this point.
236 R. D. Hursh, American Law of Products Liability (1961).
27 Schaeffer v. Michigan-Ohio Navigation Co., 416 F. 2d 217 (6th Cir. 1969).
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jurisdiction at the time of the suit subscribed to strict liability as a
basis of product liability.
The cases appearing in strict liability jurisdictions were evaluated
to determine the following:
1. In how many cases was a theory of strict liability asserted?
2. How many judgments were rendered for the plaintiff on the basis
of strict liability? Would the plaintiff have received a judgment
without the availability of strict liability? Why was strict liability
essential to a favorable judgment for the plaintiff?
3. In how many cases did the plaintiff pursue his claim on grounds
other than strict liability? How successful were the plaintiffs in
these cases?
4. Where strict liability was in the suit and the case resulted only
in a ruling, how many rulings were favorable to the plaintiff?
Would the plaintiff have received the same favorable rulings
without strict liability in the suit? If not, why not?
5. In how many strict liability cases did the manufacturer receive
a favorable judgment and for what reasons?
6. In cases brought on other grounds than strict liability and won
by the manufacturer, would the plaintiff have been successful if
strict liability had been alleged?
The cases arising in non-strict liability jurisdictions were evaluated
to determine how many were lost by the plaintiff, whether the availability
of strict liability would have changed the result, and if so, why the result
would have been altered.
As the above evaluations were made, a collateral attempt was
made to determine any difference in tendencies between the state and
federal courts.
The results of these evaluations must be tempered by significant
qualifications. First, observations were limited to the cases as reported in
the official state reports or the National Reporter System. No other
records associated with these cases were utilized. Secondly, while some
of the questions pursued could be answered quite objectively, others
required a conclusion to be reached as a matter of judgment. The
determination that a different result would have been achieved under strict
liability is a judgment decision and the product of a degree of subjectivity.
The impact of strict liability on the law of product liability is
evidenced by the ratio of cases arising in strict liability jurisdictions. Of
the 264 cases selected for this analysis, 203 were litigated in strict liability
jurisdictions or in federal courts applying the law of a strict liability juris-
diction. Of these 203 cases, 141 placed before the court the issue of strict
liability or some element of this liability. Thus, in approximately 53.4%
of the selected cases, wherein the defendant was a manufacturer, strict
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liability was in issue. Where strict liability was available to the plaintiff, it
was placed in issue in approximately 69% of the product liability cases.
Why did the plaintiff not allege strict tort liability where it was
available? The basic answer is that the doctrine does not encompass all
possible aspects of a manufacturer's product liability. The majority of the
cases where strict liability was not alleged concerned the manufacturer's
failure to warn or to adequately warn. 238 Negligence was frequently relied
on in cases where the design of the product was in issue. 239 In these cases,
the product involved was not necessarily physically defective but the
plaintiff alleged its design presented a degree of hazard or the product
could have been designed more safely. A product that is suitable for its
intended purposes and not unreasonably dangerous may produce a hazard.
However, in such circumstances strict liability allegations would be
inappropriate. Other cases, in which negligence was the basis of the suit
rather than strict liability, had as their subject matter the testing of the
product,24° improper selection of materials, 24' failure to follow specifica-
tions,242 or the existence of foreign substances in the product.M Other
actions were based on express warranties where the product was not
necessarily dangerous but it did fail to comply with the representations
of the manufacturer. 2M Nevertheless, the vast majority of cases in
strict liability jurisdictions introduced the issue of strict liability either
as the sole basis of the plaintiff's case or in conjunction with other
allegations of negligence or warranty.
23SLittlehale v. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co., 380 F. 2d 274 (2nd Cir. 1967),
applying New York law; Stref v. J. A. Sexauer Mfg. Co., 380 F. 2d 453 (2nd Cir.
1967), applying Pennsylvania law; Matthews v. Clairol, Inc., 371 F. 2d 337 (3rd
Cir. 1967), applying Pennsylvania law; Borowicz v. Chicago Mastic Corp., 367 F. 2d
751 (7th Cir. 1966), applying Illinois law; Croteau v. Borden Co., 277 F. Supp. 945
(E.D. Pa. 1968); Parris v. M. A. Bruder & Sons, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. Pa.
1966); Wallinger v. Martin Stamping & Stove Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d 437, 236 N.E. 2d
755 (1968); West v. Hydro-Test, Inc., 196 So. 2d 598 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Fisher
v. Johnson Milk Co., 12 Mich. App. 10, 163 N.W. 2d 652 (1968); Schedlbauer v.
Chris-Craft Corp., 381 Mich. 217, 160 N.W. 2d 889 (1968); Raatikka v. Olin
Mathieson Chemical Corp., 8 Mich. App. 638, 155 N.W. 2d 205 (1967); Hill
v. Wilmington Chemical Corp., 279 Minn. 336, 156 N.W. 2d 898 (1968); Thomas v.
Arvon Products Co., 424 Pa. 365, 227 A. 2d 897 (1967).
239 Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Wagner-Morehouse, Inc., 401 F. 2d 23 (7th Cir.
1968), applying Illinois law; Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F. 2d 495 (8th
Cir. 1968), applying Michigan law; Neusus v. Sponholtz, 369 F. 2d 259 (7th Cir.
1966), applying Illinois law; Moren v. Samuel M. Langston, 96 I11. App. 2d 133, 237
N.E. 2d 759 (1968); Albert v. J. & L. Engineering Co., 214 So. 2d 212 (La. Ct. App.
1968); West v. Hydro-Test, Inc., 196 So. 2d 598 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Swindler
v. Butler Manufacturing Co., 426 S.W. 2d 78 (Mo. 1968); Otis Elevator Co. v.
Wood, 436 S.W. 2d 324 (Tex. 1968).
240 Barfield v. Atlantic Coastline R.R. Co., 197 So. 2d 545 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967).
241 Fanning v. LeMay, 38 Ill. 2d 209, 230 N.E. 2d 182 (1967).
242 Stephenson v. Duriron, 292 F. Supp. 66 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
23 Glasper v. Wright Root Beer Co., 216 So. 2d 586 (La. Ct. App. 1968).
2 44 Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey, 398 F. 2d 598 (2nd Cir. 1968), applying New York
law; Perma-Strate Co. v. Gemus, 430 S.W. 2d 665 (Tenn. App. 1967).
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With respect to the 141 cases appearing in strict liability jurisdictions
and presenting an issue of strict liability, 94 resulted in a final determina-
tion of the liability issue. In 38 cases the plaintiff was successful and in 56
instances the defendant-manufacturer received a judgment of no liability.
In those cases where the plaintiff was successful, 14 apparently would
have been resolved the same way if negligence had been the basis of the
suit. These cases generally concerned a defect that was a result of
negligent design or a failure of the duty to warn.241 5 In other cases negli-
gence was entwined with the strict liability issue or the court held that
res ipsa loquitur was operative.246 In 23 of the cases decided for the
plaintiff, strict liability appeared essential to the decision. In some of these
cases, the plaintiff succeeded by carrying the burden of proving the defect
and its causal relationship to the injury. However, he was not required to
prove how the manufacturer failed to perform its legal duty.247 Of course,
if such proof had been necessary the plaintiff may have been able to carry
the burden of linking the negligence of the defendant to the defect. Strict
liability was also beneficial to the successful plaintiff in those cases where
evidence of contributory negligence was disallowed as irrelevant. 248
In those cases where the manufacturer received a favorable judgment
245 Sterling Drug Co. v. Yarrow, 408 F. 2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969), applying South
Dakota law; Vandercook & Son, Inc. v. Thorpe, 395 F. 2d 104 (5th Cir. 1968),
applying Florida law; Green v. Sanitary Scale Co., 296 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Pa. 1969);Richy v. Sumoge, 273 F. Supp. 904 (D. Or. 1967); Johnson v. Standard Brands PaintCo., 274 Cal. App. 2d 331, 79 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1969); Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E. 2d 305 (1970), affirming 93 Ill. App. 2d 334, 236 N.E. 2d 125(1968); Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 I1. App. 2d 315, 229 N.E. 2d684 (1967); Post v. American Cleaning Equipment Co., 437 S.W. 2d 516 (Ky. App.1968); McCormack v. Hankscraft, 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W. 2d 488 (1967).246 Bustamante v. Carborundum Co., 375 F. 2d 688 (7th Cir. 1967), applying Illinois
law; Brizendine v. Visador Co., 305 F. Supp. 157 (D. Or. 1969); Preissman v. Ford
Motor Co., 1 Cal. App. 3d 841, 82 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1969); Moore v. Jewel Tea
Co., 116 Ill. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E. 2d 636 (1969).
247 Wasik v. Borg, 423 F. 2d 44 (2nd Cir. 1970), applying Vermont law; Toth v.
Coming Glass Works, 411 F. 2d 912 (6th Cir. 1969), applying Ohio law; Greco
v. Buccicioni Engineering Co., 407 F. 2d 87 (3rd Cir. 1969), affirming 283 F. Supp.
978 (W.D. Pa. 1967), applying Pennsylvania law; American Motors Corp. v. Mosier,414 F. 2d 34 (5th Cir. 1969), applying Ohio law; Krause v. Sud-Aviation, 301F. Supp. 513 (S.D. N.Y. 1968); Arrow Transportation Co. v. Fruehauf, 289 F. Supp.170 (D. Or. 1968); Barth v. B. F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968); Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 79Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969); Taylor v. Carborundum, 107 Ill. App. 2d 12, 246 N.E. 2d 898(1969); Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 Il. App. 2d 315, 229 N.E. 2d684 (1967); Texaco, Inc. v. McGrew Lumber Co., 117 IMI. App. 2d 351, 254 N.E.2d 584 (1969); Ford Motor Co. v. Cockrell, 211 So. 2d 833 (Miss. 1968); Ford
Motor Co. v. Dees, 223 So. 2d 638 (Miss. 1969); Jastremski v. General MotorsCorp., 109 N.J. Super. 31, 262 A. 2d 218 (1970); Guarino v. Marine SafetyAppliance Co., 297 N.Y.S. 2d 639 (1969); affirmed 25 N.Y. 2d 460, 306 N.Y.S. 2d942, 255 N.E. 2d 173 (1969); Rooney v. S. A. Healy Co., 20 N.Y. 2d 42, 228 N.E.2d 383 (1967); Burbage v. Boiler Engineering & Supply Co., 433 Pa. 319, 249 A. 2d563 (1969); MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co., 214 Pa. Super. 304, 257 A. 2d 676(1969); Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W. 2d 630 (Tex. 1969).248 VanDorpe v. Koyker Farm Implement Co., 427 F. 2d 91 (7th Cir. 1970), applying
Illinois law; Helminger v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 230 So. 2d 623 (La. Ct. App.
1970); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W. 2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
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there did not seem to be any in which an alternate theory of liability
would have changed the result. The most prevalent reason for the
judgments for the manufacturer was failure of proof with respect to either
a defect or the existence of the defect at the time the product left the
control of the manufacturer. 249 The manufacturer escaped liability in
several instances because the plaintiff failed to prove proximate cause.20
The defenses of assumption of risk,251 unintended or misuse of the
product 252 and intervening acts of third parties 253 were employed
249 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Dondlinger & Sons Construction Co., 420 F. 2d 1368
(8th Cir. 1970), applying Missouri law; Bates v. Werner Co., 419 F. 2d 1118 (6th
Cir. 1970), applying Michigan law; Posey v. Clark Equipment Co., 409 F. 2d 560
(7th Cir. 1969), applying Indiana law; Ross v. Up-Right, Inc., 402 F. 2d 943 (5th
Cir. 1968), applying Texas law; Kepling v. Schlenter Mfg. Co., 378 F. 2d 5 (6th Cir.
1967), applying Michigan law; Barnes v. Omark Industries, Inc., 369 F. 2d 4 (8th
Cir. 1966), applying Missouri law; Clay v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 307 F. Supp. 288
(D. Colo. 1969); Dean v. General Motors Corp., 301 F. Supp. 187 (E.D. La. 1969);
Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Oil Co., 292 F. Supp. 818 (W.D. La.
1967); Burnett v. Quaker Oats Co., 289 F. Supp. 280 (E.D. Tenn. 1968); Willis
v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Melanson Co. v.
Hupp Corp., 282 F. Supp. 859 (D. N.J. 1966); Maas v. Dreher, 10 Ariz. App. 520,
460 P. 2d 191 (1969); Bennett v. International Shoe Co., 275 Cal. App. 2d 797, 80
Cal. Rptr. 318 (1969); Romig v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 271 Cal. App. 2d
420, 76 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1969); McCurter v. Norton, 263 Cal. App. 2d 402, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 493 (1968); Harris v. Belton, 258 Cal. App. 2d 595, 65 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1968);
Preston v. Up-Right, Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1966); Royal v. Black & Decker Mfg.
Co., 205 So. 2d 307 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Thomas v. Gitlett Co., 230 So. 2d 870
(La. Ct. App. 1970); Evans v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 212 So. 2d 506 (La. Ct. App.
1968); Arnold v. U.S. Rubber Co., 203 So. 2d 765 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Accetola
v. Hood, 7 Mich. App. 83, 151 N.W. 2d 210 (1967); Kerr v. Corning Glass Works,
284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W. 2d 587 (1969); Arato v. International Harvester, 294
N.Y.S. 2d 832 (1968); Randic v. Weingarten, Inc., 440 S.W. 2d 551 (Tex. Civ. App.
1970); Malinak v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 436 S.W. 2d 210 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1968); Proctor & Gamble v. Langley, 422 S.W. 2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
250 Skogen v. Dow Chemical Co., 375 F. 2d 692 (8th Cir. 1967), applying Minnesota
law; Barnes v. Omark Industries, Inc., 369 F. 2d 4 (8th Cir. 1966), applying Missouri
law; Kridler v. Ford Motor Co., 300 F. Supp. 1163 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Eck v. Helene
Curtis Industries, Inc., 9 Ariz. App. 426, 453 P. 2d 366 (1969); Tresham v. Ford
Motor Co., 275 Cal. App. 2d 403, 79 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1969); Romig v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 271 Cal. App. 2d 420, 76 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1969); Harris v. Belton, 258
Cal. App. 2d 595, 65 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1968); Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 299
So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969); Rizzo v. Jordan Wholesaler Co., 214 So. 2d 604 (Miss.
1968); Arato v. International Harvester Co., 294 N.Y.S. 2d 832 (A.D. 1968).
251 Oregon Farms Bureau Ins. Co. v. E. L. Caldwell & Sons, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 835
(D. Or. 1969); Bennett v. International Shoe Co., 275 Cal. App. 2d 797, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 318 (1969); Hogge v. United States Rubber Co., 192 So. 2d 501 (Fla. CL App.
1966); Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg. Co., Inc., 171 N.W. 2d 201 (Minn. 1969); Vanek
v. Kirby, 450 P. 2d 778 (Or. 1969); Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Pa. 324, 223 A.
2d 746 (1966); Proctor & Gamble v. Langley, 422 S.W. 2d 733 (Tex. Cir. App. 1967).
252 McDevitt v. Standard Oil Company of Texas, 391 F. 2d 364 (5th Cir. 1968),
applying Texas law; Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F. 2d 841 (5th Cir.
1967), applying Texas law; Preston v. Up-Right, Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1966);
Brandenburg v. Weaver Mfg. Co., 77 Ill. App. 374, 222 N.E. 2d 348 (1966);
Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg., Inc., 171 N.W. 2d 201 (Minn. 1969); Lambert v. Lott, 222
So. 2d 816 (Miss. 1969); Bartkevich v. Billinger, 432 Pa. 351, 247 A. 2d 603 (1968).
253 Mull v. Ford Motor Co., 368 F. 2d 713 (2nd Cir. 1966), applying New York law;
Martinez v. Nichols Conveyor & Engineering Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 795, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 842 (1966).
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frequently and successfully by manufacturers. The courts rendered
judgments for the manufacturer on holdings that the manufacturer did
not have a duty to design a product more safely, 54 that the injured party
was not within the zone of foreseeability, 255 and that of the plaintiff failed
to prove the product was that of the defendant. 256 A judgment was given a
manufacturer in one instance where the plaintiff alleged his injuries were
the result of the defect in the product and the negligence of the retail
seller but failed to prove the negligence of the retailer.257 It does not
appear that the outcome of any of the above cases would have been
changed had the manufacturer been pursued on the theory of negligence.
Of the cases surveyed in which strict liability was present, 47 were
not finally determined. The courts ruled on matters of motions to dismiss,
demurrers, or alleged errors in the trial proceedings. In 34 instances the
plaintiff received a favorable ruling from the court allowing him to pursue
his cause of action further. In 24 of these cases, the presence of strict
liability in the suit was not essential to the ruling in favor of the plaintiff.
In substantially all of the cases the negligence theory was available to the
plaintiff and the court's ruling would not have been affected had the suit
been initiated solely on that theory. In seven cases the plaintiff was
permitted to continue on the basis of strict liability where he would
have been precluded otherwise.258 In three instances the rulings were
peculiar to strict liability.259
In the 13 cases where the rulings of the court favored the manufac-
turer, the presence of strict liability was not a factor in the result. For
example, a demurrer of a component part manufacturer was sustained
where the plaintiff failed to allege that no substantial change occurred
254 Vroman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 387 F. 2d 732 (6th Cir. 1967), applying
Michigan law; McNally v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 284 N.Y.S. 2d 761 (A.D. 1967).
255 Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 275 F. Supp. 861 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
256 LaGorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
257 Forty v. Gulf Oil Corp., 428 Pa. 334, 237 A. 2d 593 (1968).
258 Olson v. Royal Metals Corp., 392 F. 2d 116 (5th Cir. 1968), applying Texas law;
plaintiff had lost on negligence theory and court sent it back for injection of implied
warranty; Kridler v. Ford Motor Co., 422 F. 2d 1187 (3rd Cir. 1967), applying
Pennsylvania law, court required no proof of negligence; Clary v. Fifth Avenue
Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P. 2d 244 (Alaska 1969), plaintiff lost on negligence issue
and it was ruled strict liability was permissible; Hutchinson v. Revlon Corp. of Cal.,
55 Cal. Rptr. 81 (1967), plaintiff lost on negligence in lower court but decision
reversed since strict liability does not require proof of negligence; DeFelice v. Ford
Motor Co., 28 Conn. Super. 164, 255 A. 2d 636 (1969), contributory negligence not
relevant in strict liability suit; Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174
N.W. 2d 672 (Iowa 1970), proof of existence of defect sufficient and plaintiff need
not show negligence; Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P. 2d 729(1969), contributory negligence not relevant in strict liability suit.
2s9 Caruth v. Mariani, 11 Ariz. 188, 463 P. 2d 83 (1970), bystander entitled to benefit
of strict liability doctrine; Ginnes v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 470 P. 2d 135 (Nev. 1970),
strict liability doctrine extends to all types of products; Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc.,
102 N.J. Super. 279, 246 A. 2d 11 (1968), implied warranties operative where services
are involved.
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in the product after it left the hands of the defendant.2 60 Manufacturers
received favorable rulings where the plaintiff failed to show that the
defect existed when it left the manufacturer's control.26' In such cases,
strict liability was of no benefit to the injured party nor would he have
been able to proceed successfully in negligence.
In those jurisdictions which recognize strict liability, the survey
revealed a total of 62 cases that did not incorporate an allegation of
strict liability. Twenty-one of these cases resulted in judgments for the
plaintiff. In the twenty-seven cases held for the defendants the injection
of strict liability into the case would have been either inappropriate or
of no consequence.
In those jurisdictions which had not as yet adopted strict liability as
described in section 402A or under a warranty concept, fifty-one cases
resulting in a judgment appeared. The plaintiff was successful in fifteen
instances producing a success ratio of approximately 30%. On analysis
it appeared that four cases lost by the plaintiffs may have been decided
otherwise if strict liability had been available262 thereby increasing the
success ratio to approximately 36%.
In summary, it is observed that a substantial percentage of the
product liability cases arise in jurisdictions that subscribe to strict liability.
This should be anticipated since numerous states have accepted this
concept and these states are among the more commercially active. From
this survey, it is difficult to extract a meaningful statistic with regard to
the impact of strict liability on the success of plaintiffs. A comparison
between the success ratio of plaintiffs in strict liability suits and the
success ratio of plaintiffs in non-strict liability jurisdictions reveals that
the plaintiffs asserting strict liability against the manufacturer experience
a 10.4% advantage. This conclusion must be highly qualified not only
because of the subjectivity involved but because of the many variables
present in a lawsuit. In any event, it does not appear that the emergence
of strict liability has made an enormous impact on the success ratio of
plaintiffs. The cases reveal the major effect of the concept has been
to reduce the plaintiff's burden of proof by eliminating the need to prove
how the defendant failed in his duty in producing the defective product.
260 Rossignol v. Danbury School of Aeronautics, Inc., 154 Conn. 549, 227 A. 2d 418
(1967).
261 Estabrook v. J. C. Penney Co., 105 Ariz. 302, 464 P. 2d 325 (1970); 0. S. Stapley
v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P. 2d 248 (1968); Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 411
S.W. 2d 443 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
262 Hill v. James Wakes Memorial Hospital, 407 F. 2d 1636 (4th Cir. 1969), North
Carolina law, privity required for breach of warranty action; Brendle v. General Tire
& Rubber Co., 304 F. Supp. 1262 (M.D. N.C. 1969), North Carolina law, privity a
bar to an implied warranty action against the manufacturer; Kenny v. Sears Roebuck
& Co., 246 N.E. 2d 649 (Mass. 1969), proof lacking that defect was a result of the
manufacturer's negligence; Haley v. Allied Chemical Corp., 231 N.E. 2d 549 (Mass.
1967), privity a defense to a warranty action.
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Since evidence on this point is not required in strict liability cases, it is
difficult to conclude from the case reports how many strict liability
cases won by plaintiffs could have been successfully pursued on the
basis of negligence. It is safe to assume that certainly some of the
cases were capable of having the issues favorably resolved for the
plaintiff. To that extent, the impact of strict liability on the manufacturer
becomes less significant.
An analysis of the 193 total cases that proceeded to judgment reveals
that the plaintiff was successful in 38.3% of the cases. The plaintiff's
success ratio for all cases decided in the federal courts was approximately
39% and in the state court systems approximately 38%. In those cases
where strict liability was present, the plaintiff's overall success ratio was
40.4%. In the federal courts it was approximately 40% and in the state
courts approximately 41.6%. It does not appear that resort to the federal
courts enhances the plaintiff's opportunity for success. There is a gratify-
ing correlation between the decisions of the two systems.
In the non-strict liability jurisdictions the success ratio of the
plaintiffs in all cases decided was approximately 30%. The federal courts
and the state courts each produced a ratio of approximately 30%. Again
no substantial advantage is gained by resort to the federal courts. There is
an appreciable difference, however, between the success ratio of plaintiffs
in all cases arising in the non-strict liability jurisdictions, approximately
30%, and the strict liability jurisdictions, approximately 40.4%.
Thus, the impact of strict liability on judgments favorable to the
plaintiff, although noticeable in the cases observed, has not been
as formidable as might be anticipated under a concept holding a
manufacturer strictly liable for his defective product. Nevertheless, the
emergence of this doctrine has been a contributing factor to the sharp
increase in the number of product liability cases filed. The Final Report
of the National Commission on Product Safety cites a threefold increase
in product liability cases to 300,000 cases from 1968 to 1969.263 The
expansive tendency of the law in this area would suggest even greater
activity in the future. Even though the success ratio of plaintiffs may
not increase substantially, the manufacturer will be faced with an
increasing number of claims that must be settled or defended.
VIII. A CLARIFICATION OF THE THEORIES
OF MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY
The manufacturer is susceptible to suit on various theories, each of
which have peculiar elements that must be alleged and proved to establish
liability. Emphasis has been given to the concept of strict liability since
this theory is of the most recent vintage, the most dynamic at the moment,
263 The National Commission on Product Safety, Final Report, June, 1970, 74.
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and is experiencing more attention from the courts as they attempt to
apply its principles to achieve a policy of consumer protection. It is not,
however, an all-encompassing basis for liability as evidenced by the
continuing resort to the theories of negligence, express warranty sounding
in contract, express warranty sounding in tort, implied warranties sound-
ing in contract and implied warranties sounding in tort. A clarification
and streamlining of the law of product liability would be advantageous to
all parties, especially the producer. Suggestions and recommendations
to achieve this clarification are the subject matter of this section.
Liability based on negligence exists in many other areas of the law.
The elements of negligence liability are well defined and have experienced
little change in the suits involving product liability. However, from the
consumer's point of view, it has proven to be an inadequate theory to
successfully reach the manufacturer and other sellers. This is one reason
the concept of strict liability was formulated by the courts. In formulating
the principles of strict liability, the courts left undisturbed the broad based
principles of the law of negligence. In product liability litigation it is often
employed as an allegation of last resort since the plaintiff must carry a
relatively greater burden of proof. Negligence liability in the product area
should remain available to injured persons in its present form. The
theories requiring greater clarity are strict liability and warranty liability.
Since the publication of section 402A in 1965, new trends in the law
of strict liability have emerged from the cases. Some of these new
developments already have substantial precedent while others are just
appearing. The imposition of this liability on others besides sellers is an
example of the former while the inclusion of commercial losses as an
element of injury is an example of the latter. In view of the developing
law it is suggested that the section be updated as follows:
Proposed Section 402A: Special Liability of One Who Places a
Product in Commerce for Physical Harm to
Persons.
(1) One who places in commerce any product in a defective condi-
tion unreasonably dangerous to a reasonably foreseeable person
or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to such person or to his property, if
(a) the one placing the product in commerce is engaged in the
business of dealing in such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach a reasonably foreseeable
person without substantial change in the condition in which
it was placed in commerce.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the one placing the product in commerce has exercised all
possible care in the preparation and delivery of the
product, and
(b) the person suffering an injury has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with the
person placing the product in commerce.
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The intention of the suggested changes is to align the Restatement
with the developing law. The first suggested change is the broadening
of the class of persons upon whom this liability is imposed. It is
intended to encompass sellers as presently defined in the comments
to section 402A264 plus lessors, suppliers of samples or persons who
supply, without cost, products complementary to their own.
The qualification that the product be unreasonably dangerous in its
defective condition is retained. The cases reviewed sustain this provision
when the basis of the suit is strict liability under section 402A in contrast
to the warranty approach. It is consistent with the tort law rationale
which imposes strict liability only when the hazard is extreme. The
comments in the Restatement on this point accurately describe the recent
legal developments. However, the standards used in determining what is
an unreasonably dangerous product, except where a latent defect is
present, have not been precisely defined. Professor Corwin D. Edwards, in
testimony before the National Commission on Product Safety, suggested
the following criteria:265
Risks of bodily harm to users are not unreasonable when con-
sumers understand the risks exist, can appraise their probability and
severity, know how to cope with them, and voluntarily accept them
to get benefits that could not be obtained in less risky ways. When
there is a risk of this character, consumers have reasonable
opportunity to protect themselves ....
But preventable risk is not reasonable (a) when consumers do not
know that it exists; or (b) when, though aware of it, consumers are
unable to estimate its frequency and severity; or (c) when consumers
do not know how to cope with it, and hence are likely to incur harm
unnecessarily; or (d) when risk is unnecessary in... that it could be
reduced or eliminated at a cost in money or in the performance of
the product that consumers would willingly incur if they knew the
facts and were given the choice...
This viewpoint reasonably reflects the policy position described in the
comments to section 402A.
The persons to whom the liability extends is restated to reflect recent
judicial tendency. The bystander is being accepted as a proper plaintiff, if
not by designation then by broadening the definition of "user." As with
negligence, strict liability is moving in the direction of benefiting any
reasonably foreseeable person and his property.
Although the argument has been advanced that there is no reason for
allowing recovery for injuries to the person and to property and at the
same time deny recovery for commercial losses, substantial precedent
does not appear in the cases reviewed to so extend strict liability. For this
264 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, Comment j.
265 The National Commission on Product Safety, Final Report, June, 1970, 11.
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reason and to be consistent with the recommendations below pertaining to
warranty, strict liability recovery should be limited as it is presently.
Subsection 1 (a) is designed to apply to persons other than sellers
but preserve the necessity of a commercial background for the transaction
whatever form it takes.
In its other aspects, section 402A sufficiently reflects the recent
developments in the common law. However, one aspect of this liability
needs to receive the special attention of the courts; namely, the placing of
this degree liability on wholesalers and retailers. In tort law strict liability
has been traditionally imposed on persons who either created an
ultrahazardous condition 266 or actively engaged in an ultrahazardous
activity. An intermediary who serves only as a conduit does not seem to
generate the degree of causation usually required to impose liability
without fault. The wholesaler, especially, who neither creates the product
or deals with the consumer seems to bear a disproportionate degree of
liability. Unless an intermediary processes or otherwise affects the
condition of the product, strict liability should not be applicable. Recourse
to the intermediaries should be based on negligence or more appropriately
on the basis of warranty. There is precedent in the law of negligence
for making special provisions for intermediaries. These provisions are
summarized in sections 401 and 402 of the Restatement and generally
impose liability on an intermediary where he knows or has reason to
know that the product is, or is likely to be dangerous and he fails
to inform his buyer of the dangers. The intermediary is not required to
inspect in the usual course of his business unless he is aware or should
be aware that the product is likely to be dangerous. As previously
noted, Ohio and Washington did not extend strict liability to the
manufacturer-seller. However, these states represent a minority position.
The contractual warranty theory of liability deserves the attention of
the Editorial Review Committee for the Uniform Commercial Code
and the state legislatures. In product liability law it would be beneficial to
precisely define "warranty" and to clarify the characteristics of such an
action. Toward this end, it is suggested that the courts describe the tort
liability of a manufacturer as either strict liability or negligence liability
and reserve the use of the word "warranty" to describe the liability of the
manufacturer or any other seller arising under the Uniform Commercial
Code. In those jurisdictions utilizing warranty concepts an analysis of the
adoption cases267 reveals that section 402A would achieve the same stated
objectives. For example, in the Lonzrick decision, the appellate court
expressly adopted the section as the basis of liability.268 Although the
266 Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
267 Supra, note 98.
268 Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 1 Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E. 2d 92 (1965).
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Supreme Court rejected this determination 2 9 and characterized the
liability as based on an implied warranty sounding in tort, the Lonzrick
decision represents strict liability as conceived by section 402A. To the
extent required, the provisions of the section could have been the basis of
the decision. In addition, the majority of jurisdictions accepting the
principle of strict liability in tort avoid the use of the term "warranty."
If "warranty" is reserved to describe the liability of a seller arising
under the Uniform Commercial Code, some revisions of the Code
must be made to align it more closely to the current law of warranty
liability and the growing concern for consumer protection.
Before offering recommendations for these revisions it should be
observed that some states varied the Code provisions regarding warranties
when enacting the Code. California and Utah excluded section 2-318
which designates the beneficiaries of the express or implied warranties.
Virginia substituted for this section a provision eliminating the
requirement of privity in actions against sellers based on warranty or
negligence.270 Recovery was permitted by those persons who would
reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods.
Maryland reworded section 2-318 to extend the warranties to "any other
ultimate consumer or user of the goods or persons affected thereby if it is
reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by
the goods and who is injured by breach of warranty." The statute further
provides "a seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section." 27'
Since the promulgation of the Code an enormous amount of case law
has evolved indicating that the provisions of the Code relating to the
beneficiaries of warranties need modification. In relatively few product
liability cases does the plaintiff rely on the Code for his recovery unless
the action is between the immediate seller and buyer. The subject of
Article 2 of the Code is the sale of tangible personal property and
the liabilities that may arise therefrom. It therefore seems proper to
suggest revisions to reflect the warranty liability of sellers of goods
as evidenced by the common law.
The cases reflect little variance from the Code's methods of creating
the warranties. Where an alleged warranty sounding in tort is in issue the
courts frequently refer to the Code for a definition of the warranty and
how it may arise.27 2 The cases do reflect a concern for injuries arising
from a use of the product other than its specific intended use. The
269 Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 205 N.E. 2d 92 (1965).
270 Code of Virginia, Title 8, § 8.2-318. See Spiedel, The Virginia "Anti-Privity"
Statute: Strict Product Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 Va. L.
Rev., 804 (1965).
271 Maryland Code Annotated, Article 95B, § 2-318.
272 Uniform Commercial Code, §§ 2-313, express warranties; 2-314, implied warranty
of merchantability; 2-315, implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
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manufacturer has been required to foresee reasonable uses other than
the ordinary intended use. Therefore, section 2-314(2) covering the
implied warranty of merchantability and defining merchantable should be
revised and clarified accordingly. Presently, the goods to be merchantable
must be fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. The
direction of the law seems to be to require that the goods must be fit for
reasonably foreseeable uses, even if unintended. For example, the
automobile is intended ordinarily for transportation not for excess
speeding and collision. Nevertheless, liability has been imposed in
automobile cases on the reasoning that such use was foreseeable.
Therefore, it is recommended that merchantable be defined to include the
requirement that the product be fit for reasonably foreseeable use or
misuse, even if unintended. Consistent with this suggestion, the same
section should also be revised to insure that a merchantable product
includes adequate instructions for proper usage and warnings against
reasonably foreseeable misuses.
Another question that has been resolved by resorting to the tort
nature of warranties is the effect of any disclaimers in the contract for
sale of the goods. When the seller has carefully drafted a disclaimer
provision its purposes have been frustrated by the employment of the
doctrine of unconscionability2 3 or by characterizing the cause of action
as one sounding in tort to which the contractual disclaimers have no
application. To reflect this judicial position, section 2-316, concerning the
exclusion or modification of warranties, should be revised to place
the burden of establishing the conscionability of any disclaimer on the
manufacturer or seller. However, it is not commercially feasible to hold
a manufacturer or seller liable in all events for breach of any implied
warranty. In the case of used cars that are known by both the seller and
buyer to be unsafe for use, a seller should not be held accountable for
breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. Presently, the Code
protects the seller in this situation by permitting disclaimers in these
circumstances and there is seldom a conscionability problem. However, to
achieve the present posture of the common law and retain the warranties
under the Code, it is recommended that the section be revised to make
any attempt to exclude, disclaim or limit the implied warranties of
merchantability or fitness prima facie unconscionable. A further provision
must then be promulgated to exonerate a seller from implied warranty
liability for injuries caused to a user when the user knows of the
product's condition, understands the risks involved and still uses
the product. This latter provision reflects the official comments to this
section of the Code,274 and would permit the use of an untested product
at the assumed risk of the buyer.
273 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960).
274 Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-316, Comment 8.
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When a court reaches the position that the warranties involved in a
suit are in the nature of a tort not only are the disclaimer provisions of
the Code preempted but also the notice provisions of section 2-607 are
held irrelevant. Therefore, it is recommended that the notice requirement
for breach of warranty be deleted from the Code. The concern reflected by
this section for the seller can be preserved by retaining notice for other
purposes than breach of warranty and retaining the statute of limitations
period at four years measured from the time the injury or damage occurs.
Where the injury or damage is not apparent or obvious the statute should
begin to run from the date the user or consumer should reasonably have
been aware of such injury or damage. Section 2-725 of the Code establish-
ing the statute of limitations period should be revised accordingly.
The significant area for revision in the Code is section 2-318 which
specifies the beneficiaries of any warranties. This section confronts the
privity issue which few jurisdictions continue to regard as a bar to
proceeding against a manufacturer. Sufficient definition has emerged
from the common law to crystallize this section.
In this regard, a distinction should be made between the beneficiaries
of any express warranty or implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose and the implied warranty of merchantability. With reference to
the former an element of reliance must be present. In contrast, the implied
warranty of merchantability is concerned with the reasonable expectations
of the user. With this difference in mind, it is suggested that the
beneficiaries of these warranties be separately defined as follows:
A merchant's express warranties or implied warranty of fitness
extends to any ultimate consumer or user of the goods who relies
upon these warranties if it is reasonably foreseeable that such person
may use or consume the goods and such person is injured in his
property or person by breach of the warranty. A merchant may not
exclude or limit the operation of this provision.
A merchant's implied warranty of merchantability extends to any
ultimate consumer or user of the goods if it is reasonably foreseeable
that such person may use or consume the goods and such person is
injured in his property or person by the breach of warranty. A
merchant may not exclude or limit the operation of this provision.
The above suggested revision encompasses the beneficiaries presently
enumerated in section 2-318 and extends to those persons currently
permitted by many courts to bring direct actions against the manufac-
turers under the warranty theory. It does, however, expressly exclude the
bystander. Consistent with tort law principles, the bystander's remedy
should be founded on a theory of strict liability involving not merely a
defective product but an inherently or imminently dangerous product.
An alignment of the Code with the concept of strict liability in tort
and the case law requires resolution of the issue of what kinds of damages
may be recovered. There is little authority for awarding purely com-
Spring 1971
64
Akron Law Review, Vol. 4 [1972], Iss. 2, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol4/iss2/7
PRODUCT LIABILITY
mercial losses as an element of damage in an action based on strict
liability in tort. There is some authority for allowing differences in value
between the product as it exists and as it was warranted to be when an
express warranty is the basis of the suit.2 5 The Code presently authorizes
the limitation of damages and remedies where the standard of conscion-
ability is not offended.27 6 It expressly provides that limitations of
consequential damages for injuries to the person in the case of consumer
goods is prima facie unconscionable. 277 Again, when a product liability
suit is pursued against the manufacturer and is characterized as an action
in tort, the contractual limitations are not applicable. It is therefore,
recommended that the Code reflect this position by providing that any
limitation of damages for breach of any implied warranty for physical
injury to the person or to his property, including diminution in value, is
prima facie unconscionable. In the absence of any strong authority to the
contrary, the Code provision that limitation of damages where the loss
is commercial is not prima facie unconscionable would be retained.
If the state legislature through the efforts of the American Law
Institute and the National Conference of Commissions on Uniform State
Laws can be induced to incorporate the above changes for the purpose of
bringing the Code up to date with the common law developments and
to produce uniformity, a significant step will have been achieved toward
clarifying the haziness in this area of the law. In addition, the courts
should strive to apply the concept of strict liability uniformly using the
same theory of liability with identical elements. The existence of confusing
theories and variances among the jurisdictions works an injustice to an
injured party and to the manufacturer. If the above direction in the law
is pursued, the manufacturer's liability will be founded upon either
negligence, a well defined area of legal liability, warranty, as provided in
the express provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, or on strict
liability in tort as defined in the Restatement. The manufacturer will be
exposed to liability to the classes of persons described for any injuries
to their person or to their property including diminution in value, when
his product is not as warranted or is in an unreasonably defective
condition. The manufacturer will still be able to guard against commercial
losses and will be able to insure against more adequately defined liability.
These recommendations acknowledge the present concern for the
consumer in the legislature, the courts, and the public forum.
On the Horizon
New developments in the law of product liability at the national level
can be anticipated. The common law has introduced new principles of
275 Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E. 2d 583 (1965).
276 Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-719.
277 Id., § 2-719(3).
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liability and discarded old concepts to distribute the losses arising from
products across a broader economic base. Its major contribution has been
and continues to be its flexibility and responsiveness to the needs of a
particular circumstance of injury. The criticism usually leveled at the
common law is that it acts retroactively. Prevention of the injury, it is
urged, is a more desirable objective. The automobile industry is presently
operating under the provisions of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act.278 Product standards are being established by the Department
of Transportation. Legislative flexibility directed toward preventing the
marketing of unsafe products has been recommended.27 9 In October,
1969, President Nixon, in a special message to Congress, urged the
enactment of a legislative program described as a "Buyer's Bill of
Rights." 280 The 91st Congress did not react to the recommendation. A
modified proposal was presented by the President to the 92nd Congress in
February, 197 1.281 Under this proposal a product safety program would
be established within the Department of Health, Safety and Welfare with
the Secretary having the authority to fix minimum safety standards for
products and ban from the marketplace those products that fail to
meet the standards. Consumers, either as individuals or as a class, could
bring suits for damages for violation of the act. In addition, the
government could proceed against a violator in a civil proceeding which
could result in a penalty of $10,000 for each violation.
Coincidentally with the President's recommendations, legislation was
introduced in the Senate toward the same objectives. 282 This legislation
would create a new administrative agency entitled the Consumer Product
Safety Commission with powers to promulgate product safety standards
and other pertinent regulations, such as testing methods and requirements,
for the purpose of reducing risk of injury or death from the performance,
construction, finish or packaging of products. The commission would be
empowered to ban ultrahazardous products and to seek injunctive relief
when its regulations were not being followed. Civil and criminal penalties
not in excess of $500,000 are included. The act specifically reserves to
the consumer all of his remedies under the common law of any state
statute and provides for a civil suit by any consumer injured by violation
of the act in which the remedy is treble damages plus attorney fees.
Companion legislation defines the warranty duties of a warrantor of a
278National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 1381, 1397(c).
279 National Commission on Product Safety, Final Report, June 1970.
280 115 Cong. Rec. Part 24, 32432-32436 (1969).
281 117 Cong. Rec. H886-H889 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1971).
282 Senate Bill S.983, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, To Protect Consumers Against
Unreasonable Risk of Injury From Hazardous Products and Other Purposes.
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product and extends these warranties to the purchaser.2a 3 An express
disclaimer of any implied warranties is disallowed if any express warranty
of a consumer product against defect or malfunction is made in writing to
a purchaser. The conscionability test is otherwise applied to any
exclusion of implied warranties. Consumers are given the ability to
bring a civil action for violation of the act and seek damages plus
attorney fees and expenses. The Federal Trade Commission may also
proceed civilly against any violator. It can be anticipated that some
of these recommendations will be enacted in the coming years.
Conclusion
The objective of this article has been to impart an understanding of
the law of product liability, to explore the direction of the law as
evidenced by recent decisions of the courts, and to recommend steps that
would considerably clarify and define the elements of liability. With the
current emphasis on consumerism, this area of the law will continue
to expand and experience significant developments. Manufacturers can
anticipate the next major development in the form of federal legislation
creating or assigning to an existing administrative agency the power to
regulate product design or safety standards and providing civil remedies
for consumers injured by any product or misrepresentations associated
with any product. The emergence of such an agency will provide an
entirely new arena for the development of the law of product liability.
283 Senate Bill S.986, 92nd Congress, 1st Session. To Provide Minimum Disclosure
Standards for Written Consumer Product Warranties Against Defect or Malfunction.
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